Showing posts with label Vicente Maubocy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Vicente Maubocy. Show all posts

Saturday, 8 December 2012

THE LACK OF PROPORTION AND RATIONALITY OF MEGAPROJECT TACI MANE



BY : VICENTE MAUBOCY
Dili, December 4th, 2012


Synopsis :

Vicente maubocy
The objective of this article is to invite all Timorese, Members of Government, Members of Parliament, politicians and academics to share their opinions, thoughts and critical analyses and present their feedbacks regarding the multibillion dollar megaproject called Taci Mane.

Most ministers have the ambition of fathering large multimillion dollar projects, in part to promote their reputation, prestige, image and self-importance during and after their mandate. This kind of attitude is quite normal and legitimate.

The question I raise here is: will the Taci Mane project bring quick direct benefits to the people? Will the project be the solution to fight poverty and misery?

The leaders of this country must apply the principles of proportion and rationality when assessing the wisdom of decisions involving huge costs but minimal benefits with regard to the standard of living of the population. 

Applying the principles of rationality and proportion to projects valued in the billions of dollars will result in efficiently reduced costs while responding to emergency situations with efficacy.

Efficiency: achieving goals at a better cost

Efficacy: achieving the right goals in the right way

The concept of rationality dictates that we use intelligence when planning projects involving billions of dollars for our economic development, with our minds set first on costs and risks.

Boasting benefits only, without any serious reference to costs and risks demonstrates childish and irrational irresponsibility. Ministers with such biased objectives are clearly putting their personal interest ahead of the people’s.

The author did some research about the above and read that, as quoted by the economist Peter Drucker, Bertold Brecht had said: “Economic development first comes to the belly and then comes morality” and Peter Drucker continues: “and filling the belly is what economics is all about in the main. Therefore in all political and social decisions economic cost are calculated and taken into account. To talk only of “benefits” I consider irresponsible and bound to lead to disaster.”
We read in the newspapers and saw on television announcements which exclusively referred to benefits and promised a spectacular Taci Mane Paradise. Inch’Allah, all Timorese will happily live ever after and Alfredo Pires will obtain a license for replacing Xanana. You can count on my support!
A balanced sense of proportion would involve being realistic and pragmatic in the Timorese context with the country’s current financial capabilities. We need to be spending money in proportion to the needs of the population. Deng Xia Ping said that “all development should deliver fruition directly to the people”.
I believe in the concept of “development with a focus on improving the general standard of living”, but I have some doubts, as follows:
1.     The Four Lane Motorway from Suai to Vikeke, the Supply Base in Suai, the Refinery in Betano: are these a priority for raising the general standard of living?
2.     Why a Supply Base in Suai, a Refinery in Betano, an LNG plant in Beaco? Why not build everything in one place? Is this meant to improve cost efficiency?
3.     What’s the rationale for dispersing all these projects? Granted, if Timor-Leste were the size of Russia, America or Australia, I would understand, but here?
4.     Investment for the Supply Base, or whatever other project, must be based on market forces, not on the whims and self-importance of some individuals

Supply Base

The correct terminology should be a “port” serving Oil & Gas activities. The major component is a port.  Building a port in Suai-Kamenassa will not be as easy as in Labuan or Lamongan. In Suai-Kamenassa a lot of money will need to be spent on building breakwaters, as there is no minimal natural protection in that location. The cost will be of the order of $500 million.

We delivered to Messrs. Alfredo and Monteiro the results of the geotechnical and geophysical surveys at Suai-Kamenassa, showing that the location did not meet the minimum requisites but that Suai-Loro was appropriate for a floating port.  We submitted a design for a Floating Multipurpose Wharf with an associated Dry Dock for $40 million, the size of which was twice that of Dili Port’s.

Alfredo is stubborn, he wants to build a bigger port, and displays a dictatorial attitude to promote his name. There is ample proof of Alfredo’s “hypocrisy and arrogance”, as follows:

i.                In 2008 we submitted an offer for a $5 to 6 million AUV survey. Fugro performed the survey in 2012 for $10 million;
ii.               We submitted an offer for a port in Suai-Loro for $40 million, with a lead time of 18 months. Alfredo and Monteiro decided to spend over $500 million on a port with no completion date in view. I don’t understand why they want to spend so much money. They might have some ulterior motives.
iii.              We also obtained overseas investment for a multimillion dollar project designed to reduce the price of electricity from 50 cents to 6 cents per kWh. Mr. Alfredo opposed all kinds of obstacles to the project, despite the Prime Minister’s endorsement and his instruction to Alfredo to facilitate the project. 


The Utopia of the Suai Supply Base when compared to Labuan and Lamongan

Mr. Alfredo compares Labuan, in Malaysia, and Lamongan, near Surabaya, with Suai-Kamenassa, but the former two are very different: they don’t need breakwaters. The geographical location, topography and history are a world apart from those of Suai-Kamenassa. Attempts to imitate or copycat these ports indicate authentic imbecility and lunacy.

How is that so? Labuan has been a trade center in the British Empire since 1846, with activities covering the South China Sea. On 16th April 1984, Labuan became an International Offshore Financial Center (IOFC). Its port occupies 178 hectares.

Lamongan supplies equipment and services to the Oil & Gas industry in the East Java Sea to hundreds of customers and supports its activities with the industry of Surabaya and its 20 million inhabitants. The port occupies 79 hectares, of which 23 are actually used.

Does Suai really require such a large expensive port, with its 1,200 hectares? Where is the market? How long will it take for the investment to be amortized?

I agree that we need a port on the South Coast, but reasonably sized and with a budget of about $50 million, maximum. The best place, according to our surveys, is Suai-Loro with its natural protection. It is not Suai-Kamenassa.


Betano Refinery

Before creating a refinery, the first thing to build would be a port to receive the raw crude oil and export the products, diesel, gasoline, naphta, jet fuel, asphalt, lubricants, heavy oil, petrochemicals, etc.

I don’t know the capacity of the refinery in Betano: small, medium, large? Where will the crude oil be obtained from?

I did some research, which shows that profit from refining oil does not exceed $4 per barrel.

Here is some interesting data:

i.                Indonesia has 10 refineries, from small at 3,800 barrels per day (b/d) to large at 348,000 b/d
ii.               Malaysia has 6 refineries, from 40,000 to 156,000 b/d
iii.              Singapore has 3 large refineries, from 285,000 to 605,000 b/d
iv.             Australia has 8, from small at 10,000 b/d to large at 138,000 b/d
v.              Thailand has 5, from 100,000 to 200,000 b/d


Cost of building a refinery? $4 billion for a 270,000 barrels per day refinery. A small size refinery is likely to cost $2 billion.

Mr. Alfredo, have you decided yet where the raw material will come from? The resource at Kitan will only last 3 years. The closest place with a refinery is Indonesia and they have ten refineries. How will you compete?


Four Lane Motorway Suai to Vikeke

All Timorese have the ambition one day of driving on luxury highways such as those found in Australia. But we don’t need four lanes yet, two lanes are sufficient, provided they are of good quality.

Four Lane Motorways are premature in this country and represent a useless expense. The main beneficiaries will be consultants, contractors, and above all, the Timor GAP Task Force.

I did extensive research about roads and their characteristics in mountainous environments such as in Timor-Leste. We need good quality roads, which will result in very high investments. 

A quality road would cost between $5 and $10 million per kilometer. In the eastern part of the country, Dili-Baucau-Lospalos, you will probably need about $5 million per kilometer; in the Dili-Aileu-Same-Ainaro and Dili-Ermera-Bobonaro areas which are affected by severe erosion, the price tag would be up to $10 million per kilometer. Roads need to be raised at least 1 to 2 meters and need to be at least 8 meters wide and everything needs to be done to facilitate rainwater runoff beneath the road. For these reasons, among others, roads need to be built out of reinforced concrete.

The Government can achieve huge savings from other projects, but not from road construction. If roads are cheaply built, they will be devastated by the first rains and will require heavy repairs every year.  Better invest in durable roads than in cheap roads. Mr. Alfredo, put aside your Taci Mane project and concentrate on building quality roads where they are needed. And when you become Prime Minister you will be in a position to dedicate them.

And the priority at this time is to build roads on the North Coast where so much people reside, in order to improve the transportation of people and goods.


Pipeline to Beaco

The pipeline issue is going from bad to worse because of the incompetence of Mr. Alfredo and his team, which, in the course of the last five years, have achieved absolutely no progress, even minimal. The lowest point was reached in October when Alfredo’s and Emilia’s US lawyer, Pierre Prosper, announced in Australia that Timor-Leste might exit the CMATS Treaty.

Mr. Alfredo, don’t you appreciate the huge efforts spent by so many in so many places for the elaboration of the CMATS Treaty, which came into effect on February 23rd, 2007?  Because you were not involved, you don’t realize how painful it was to reach this agreement. However, those who were involved in the negotiations, Alkatiri, Ramos Horta, Xanana, and all our friends from Australia and America will remember the pressure that needed to be applied on the Government of Australia before an agreement could be reached.

I know your intention and your ambition: that Timor-Leste acquire 100% of Greater Sunrise. My friend, the issue of altering the South Lateral Equidistance Line that Indonesia and Australia established in 1972 is not an easy one. If the islands of Leti, Moa and Lakor were Timorese, there wouldn’t be a problem, but they’re not. References to “Trigg and Bialek”, for example, point out that “Leti is more likely to be given full effect than the corresponding baseline point of the unpopulated East Timor island of Jako as it is nine times the size and has a permanent population. It has been argued that it may be difficult for East Timor to assert that Leti should not be given full weight, given that Indonesia has a well-established baseline around the outmost points of its islands.”

Mr. Alfredo, you haven’t reached the age of 55 yet and consequently your thinking is still very ruthless. You want to dominate the world in the fashion of Alexander the Great or Napoleon. You don’t consider risks, costs and consequences. You think everything is simple.

In our opinion, you cannot obtain your pipeline to Timor-Leste if you don’t first satisfy to the following requisites:

1.     The Government of Timor-Leste must buy out the current operators for the amount of their expected profit of between $4 and $6 billion, if the operators accept to be bought out;
2.     The Australian Government must accept a newly appointed operator;
3.     The Government of Timor-Leste must pay the Australian Government 50% of the total expected tax revenue, an upfront payment of $13 billion.


In conclusion

1.     There must be a certainty that the pipeline will come to Timor-Leste before any investment is decided for the LNG plant or the Supply Base;
2.     Before you start building a refinery you must establish a reliable source for the crude oil. Has Timor-Leste the capacity to compete with Indonesia, Australia and Singapore?
3.     The Suai-Vikeke road needs to be two lanes only with a width of at least 8 meters. If it is to be a quality road, the $45 million currently allocated is far from being sufficient;
4.     A quality road building program will require a huge investment. Like it or not, the Government must invest in good durable quality roads, otherwise we’ll face a never ending cycle of pot holes and road repairs;
5.     Exiting the Timor Sea treaties is neither easy nor simple, it would be a very complex issue, contrary to the way Alfredo sees it. His thinking is childish and adventurous, especially when billions of dollars are at stake. 
6.     Spending money without a real purpose is like casually pouring water or wine out of a bottle: after filling the glasses you will realize that the bottle is empty

Thursday, 8 November 2012

THE EMILIA AND ALFREDO PIRES HEGEMONY OVER PROJECTS SUCH AS G7 AND TACI MANE

Vicente Maubocy 
OOPINION By Vicente Maubocy

Sister and brother Emilia and Alfredo Pires are trying to inscribe their names in the history of Timor-Leste through G7 or Taci Mane-like projects. They are very good at using opportunities (opportunists) and also at using other people’s sweat and effort (parasites). They sit in in their air conditioned offices and homes, did not spend any time campaigning, and suddenly they have the good fortune of becoming Finance Minister and Minister of Petroleum, their fate arising from Xanana’s big name, according to the “law of the least effort”.

The Melbourne Mafia is very smart when building their structure and putting together their people, and they dominate the Vth Constitutional Government for their own long term self- interest. In this case, the strategic positions are Finance Minister to manage the Government funds, Petroleum Minister, as petroleum is where the government gets all its money, the President of the Council of Ministers, this being the place where important agendas are elaborated and discussed and decisions at high level made, in a way totally controlled by the Melbourne Club Mafia. The Melbourne Club Mafia is aware of our Older Brother’s weaknesses, which helps them achieve their objectives. Facts and evidence will expose their maneuvers and manipulations.

Let’s analyze the trajectories of the Melbourne Club Mafia

Emilia Pires, as the Finance Ministry from 2007 onwards, tried to appropriate the G7 group for her personal projects, showing her performance inside Timor-Leste as well as outside. Inside Timor-Leste, she tried to convince Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao to trust her so that she could impose her personal self-interested views as well as her cronies’ of the Melbourne Club. In that view, she tried to manipulate and dominate economic strategic sectors such as Finance and Petroleum and to manage the Petroleum Fund.

She attempted to convince the International Community through the World Bank Financial Institution. Her strategy for obtaining the trust of the World Bank is to use the flag of the fight against poverty through the institution of G7 so that in the end she could one day become a World Bank manager. She wants to emulate Sri Mulyani, a former Finance Minister from Indonesia, who became a World Bank manager. Emilia is confident that she could use G7 as a springboard to get acquainted with Ban Ki Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, and get nominated to the world class United Nations Millennium Development Goals Panel. AgioPereira, as the spokesman of Government, releases communiques in praise of Emilia Pires while other members of Government that do not belong to their group do not receive any attention despite their achievements.

In the worst cases of manipulation of the decisions of the Council of Ministers, the final version sent to the President of the Republic for publication in the Journal of the Republic is contrary to the decision. There are many examples, such as when the Government decided to lease the SAPT building to ENSUL for 99 years and the then Minister of Justice expressed his desire to re- examine the issue, which was not authorized by Agio Pereira. The same thing happened about the appointment of the temporary Chairman of the Board of RTTL, Esposito Ximenes, whose mandate was supposed to be for the duration of the Government only and a new Chairman should have been appointed by the new Government: in reality, it was learned later that the appointment of Mr. Esposito Ximenes had been recorded in the Journal of the Republic for a four year mandate.

Manipulations by Emilia Pires

Emilia Pire’s actions have demonstrated her ambition: to add the Foreign Affairs Minister’s portfolio to her own Finance Minister portfolio. According to the constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, the mission of the Foreign Affairs Minister is to execute the external affairs policies. A few years ago the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Zacarias Albano da Costa had a confrontation with Emilia Pires and big boss Agio Pereira of the Melbourne Club, involving Xanana. Emilia Pires had lobbied an Indian IT Training Institute to accept students from Timor. It appeared later that the Institute had no international recognition. More seriously, Emilia Pires sent her Director General for Cooperatives to sign an agreement, in violation of state protocol: in the case of a treaty between nations, in absence of the Minister, only the Vice-Minister is entitled to sign. Director General Santina Cardose was made Vice Minister and the decision was forced on old man Xanana.

In this Vth Constitutional Government, Jose Luis Guterres doesn’t have any power as foreign Affairs Minister, he doesn’t execute any foreign affairs policies, he just attends to meetings and establishes agendas according to Amelia’s strategic interests. Amelia Pires grasped the role of Foreign Minister so that she could solve the problems of the world and implement her ambitions with regards to the G7. Inside the country, Emilia Pires and Agio Pereira use Xanana’s influence to fulfill their own economic objectives. For all things, the final decision is theirs. For example, recently, before the formation of the Vth Government, they were not part to the electoral campaign efforts, but although the CNRT Party Structure was the one to really work hard, in the end it was not involved in the decision making to form the Government. The ones who decided were Agio Pereira, Emilia Pires, and the Melbourne Club.


Dionisio Babo is nominally the Secretary General of CNRT, but in reality the Secretary General is Agio Babo, advised by Emilia Pires. The list of cabinet candidates that was presented to Xanana was elaborated by Agio Pereira and Emilia Pires of the Melbourne Club. 

The list of candidates

prepared by the Executive Structure of CNRT did not even reach Xanana. This shows that the Melbourne Club tries hard to isolate Xanana from the structure of CNRT.

The composition of the Vth Government clearly shows that the Melbourne Club Mafia is consolidating its power through enhanced portfolios: Agio Pereira, Minister of State, President of the Council of Ministers, Emilia Pires, Finance Minister with a portfolio reinforced by that of the former Economy and Development Minister, Joao Goncalves, and Alfredo Pires, promoted from Secretary of State to Minister, thus gathering the power to make all the decisions for the big projects of Taci Mane, Greater Sunrise, etc. The Melbourne Club Mafia installed their people in all the key positions of the economy: Petroleum Fund Manager at the Finance Ministry, ANP, Timor GAP, FCDH, CNA, etc. The Melbourne Club also tried to obtain $200 million more for the budget by using the Petroleum Fund and financial operations on the international market. Emilia Pires with her Melbourne Club Mafia has also installed her agents in all Ministries and more importantly in the Cabinet of the Prime Minister where a strategy was elaborated to ensure that their messages reach the Prime Minister at the appropriate time. Before meeting with the Prime Minister to impose their plans, Emilia Pires, Alfredo Pires and Agio Pereira first call Elizabeth Esposto to inquire whether “the Prime Minister is in a good mood or not”. If Elizabeth says “the Prime Minister is in a god mood”, then they go and see Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao. A concrete result is the Hera port and there are many more.

Emilia Pires, Alfredo Pires, Agio Pereira and their Melbourne Club Mafia enjoy a special treatment: for example, only just recently, before the Budget Ratification, all members of government had to stay in Timor to discuss the issue. However, the Melbourne Club could enjoy their holiday abroad, instead of staying home to discuss the Budget Ratification.

The Budget Ratification wasn’t obtained yet that Agio Pereira went overseas, and Alfredo Pires and his Melbourne Club spent the holidays in Bali, at Nusa Dua, while other Members of Government were in Parliament, responding to Parliamentarian criticism.
Emilia Pires manages to impose her desires and ambition to appropriate G7 in order to promote herself so that one day she can obtain a position of responsibility within some international financial institution. She takes advantage of Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao and other available resources, technical and financial, at her office to promote her activities at G7 level. Helder da Costa is the intellectual PhD and the Master of Ceremonies to promote Emilia Pires’ image, prestige and name within international financial institutions, so that one day she can develop some career at the World Bank.

Evidence of these self-promotional efforts is to be found in the “Four Corners” program of Australian ABC on October 1st, 2012. She showed herself on television, discussing tax matters related to Bayu Undan, claiming that ConocoPhillips owed $3 billion in back taxes. I have the feeling that this is some big absurdity. Why did she not wake up until now? Five years in the job and Emilia Pires’ and Alfredo Pires’ teams were not interested in the matter until now? Didn’t the tax teams of the Ministry of Finance and the accounting team of ANP monitor the production quantities weekly, monthly and yearly? More ironically, upon inquiring ourselves with ANP in the past, we found the data there were absolutely inconsistent. When we inquired about the correct data from the Australian Resource Department, we were told that ANP was in charge of all that information (big confusion).

Later on, a lady from the Australian Resource Department came to visit Emilia Pires and when she inquired about production quantities, Emilia said: “I don’t know!” (big absurdity). She should have said: “I don’t know the exact quantities but however I will let you know after I consult with the relevant division”. This shows Emilia Pires is a “dimwit”.

Alfredo flew to Suai in a UN helicopter with the ABC reporter to make propaganda for his mega project, Taci Mane. They then went to Hera to show the Power Plant and he said that the pipeline from Sunrise would supply the gas for the Power Station. More ridiculously, Alfredo promoted the Hera Power Plant as his own project, within his portfolio. According to regulation, he should have invited Januario Pereira, the Secretary of State for Electricity, to accompany him, as this project belongs to Januario’s Department.
I asked Januario about the visit and he said: “Brother, I didn’t know”. I told Januario: “you must be careful with the Melbourne Club Mafia, we will end up like headless chicken”. Also, “we cleared the land, sowed the seeds, harvested the crop, took the crop to the house and cooked, after which the Melbourne Club Mafia stole all the food from us. They eat and are satisfied, but we only have air to fill our bellies and by the end of the day we will be sick”.

I have no idea how Alfredo will bring the gas from Beaco to Hera. Which means of transportation will he use? Pipeline? Ships? Trucks? From the way it looks his concept is not very clear. How can Alfredo achieve success? I have a lot of doubt about Alfredo’s capacity to carry out his Taci Mane project. In the next article, I will describe in detail all the reasons why the Taci Mane Project will not succeed, so that readers can appreciate the issues and make their own assessments.

Practice is the criterion of truth, acts derive from thinking. From their behavior, I am convinced that the Melbourne Mafia now in the Vth Government dominates the strategic sectors of Finance, Petroleum and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, with their own agenda about all the important national issues. I can see that some members of the Vth Government are clever, but they don’t have the courage to counter the Melbourne Club Mafia.

How can we fight the manipulations of the Melbourne Club Mafia?

This is the responsibility of all, Parliamentarians, Politicians, Academics, Businesspeople: all together we have the strength to destroy it.

TIMOR SEA TREATY

OPINION By Vicente Maubocy 

This article will analyze the lifetime of Bayu Undan. Within three years liquids will be exhausted and revenue will drop 65%; examine the Sunrise economic value; investigate the LNG versus FLNG polemic; comment on which one is better for Timor-Leste.

The question of the Timor Sea resources is practically within the exclusive scope of Alfredo and Monteiro’s. Decisions are made according to their taste and pleasure. Their lies would lead Prime Minister Xanana to spend billions of dollars from the Petroleum Fund in projects which will not contribute to the better livelihood of the people in the future.



This article will justify, using the evidence below, why the South Coast Project is irrational and absurd. It will also reveal facts and the logical justification of the FLNG versus LNG polemic.

There is another important question for the readers. Why has Maubocy just woken up and why did he not come up to the public before?

The answer is consideration for and protection of our Older Brother Xanana. Since August 2007 and up to August 2012 the political situation was heated. Had I opened my mouth I would have put our Older Brother Xanana’s reputation and credibility at risk, and the political opposition would have taken advantage of the momentum to discredit our Older Brother.

Also, the political stability was fragile all around Dili; hence I didn't want to add fuel to the fire and opted for "silence", so the opponents would not attack our Older Brother Xanana.

In August 2008, one month after starting the bathymetric survey, we alerted Alfredo and Monteiro that the results of the survey indicated that the pipeline would face "great risk" due to the complex topography of the ocean floor. It would be better to think about "another option" in order not to spend millions or billions of dollars in vain.

During the 2011 survey of the LNG plant site in Beaco, we again advised Monteiro and Domingos Lekisiga that the Beaco location was "not suitable" to build an LNG infrastructure because there were indications of soil erosion offshore that represented a large obstacle to the pipeline and would use up billions of dollars. We asked: if thepipeline to Beaco fails, how will you fix the thing? They are all young. Without the experience they replied proudly: "no problem".

I thought about talking to our Older Brother about this issue. After considering for a week whether to go or not to go, I finally made the decision not to go, and rather wait for the results of 2012 elections. This way Alfredo and Monteiro would have the opportunity to hit their head against the wall and learn the great lesson of their lifes, that they should not play around with very high cost projects.

The Timor Sea Treaty in 2003 covers three issues

1. It refers to the JPDA area where Timor-Leste gets 90% of the revenue from Gas and Condensate and Australia gets 10%;

2. In relation to the Unitization Agreement, Timor-Leste gets 18% from Sunrise for its territorial waters possession;

3. In January 2006 the Australian and Timor-Leste Foreign Affairs Ministers signed the Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS) Treaty according to which Timor-Leste gets 50% of the Sunrise revenue and puts off all claims to new maritime borders for 50 years.

On 27 February 2007 the CMATS Treaty entered into force. However, should a development plan not be implemented within six years, the agreement could become void.

Reserves at Bayu Undan

The Bayu Undan reserve is the main source of current revenue, between $130-150 million monthly for Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste has $12 billion deposited in an American bank.

Gas quantity: 3.4 tcf; during the last seven year 1.2 tcf have been produced; the balance is 2.2 tcf. If divided by 0.17 (the annual production), we find the remaining gas will last for 13 years. The price of gas is lower than that of the liquids. Price of liquids is two to three times higher than that of gas.

Liquids (condensates): 380 million barrels; 275 million barrels have been produced in nine years based on an annual consumption of 30.55. (275/9).

380-275 = 105/30.55 = 3.4. The result of this calculation is that the reserve of liquids only has 3.4 years to go. One thing the people doesn’t know, is that the price of liquids is higher, and represents the equivalent of 65% of the revenue. If the revenue from the liquids ends, revenues will drop to $50-30 million monthly. After looking at these figures we need to be very cautious about how arbitrarily we spend money and we need to seek ways for Sunrise to enter into production in the next five years, before the Bayu Undan reserves dry up.

Economic value of Sunrise

The Sunrise gas total reserve is 5.2 tcf; condensate 225 million barrels. Total sales $48 billion (capital investment $9 billion, operation costs$ 8.7 billion).

Gas income for Timor-Leste: $7.8 billion, income for liquids $5.3 billion. Additional cost to bring LNG plant to Beacu: $5 billion. Hence, according to Alfredo and Monteiro’s dream, they must spend an extra $5 billion to build the required infrastructure. If doing so, the spare gas money will be only $2.5 billion.

Based on references from La’o Hamutuk, Alfredo’s mega projects on the South Coast will cost $5-$10 billion. Therefore the $12 billion of the Petroleum Fund will be up to Alfredo to spend as he sees fit. Management and Administration fees for the South Coast project will be 10%, the equivalent of $500 million for Alfredo and his group to become millionaires and be the new masters in Timor-Leste.

Try to apply $5 billion to housing for the veterans at the unit cost of $50,000 per house, you’ll get 100,000 houses. If building each house employs four people you will create jobs for 400,000 workers.

When comparing Alfredo’s $5 billion South Cost Project with building 100,000 houses for the people, which one comes as the better of the two? Readers, politicians, civil society, members of parliament, you can reach to the conclusion.

LNG versus FLNG: which one is better for Timor-Leste?

LNG and FLNG are practically the same thing. LNG facilities or infrastructures are built onshore and those for an FLNG, offshore.
Alfredo and Monteiro want the LNG in Beacu and for that they will spend $5-$10 billion so as to get their 10% administration fee. With this rationale, they stubbornly lie left and right to implement their plan and achieve their objectives.

Building the LNG Plant will require infrastructures as follows; refrigeration equipment separation equipment, compressors, offloading equipment, port, pipeline, wide roads from Dili to Viqueque to transport the equipment because a port does not exist yet.

Risks to the pipeline

In September 2008, after getting the first results for the bathymetric survey, we alerted Alfredo and Monteiro that the ocean floor was not favorable and the pipeline would face great risk . Hence try to look at other options. In 2011 we warned Alfredo again that in Beaco the pipeline option would incur many difficult technical problems. It could be a success or a failure.

Associated risks

1. During the pipeline installation phase, if water enters the pipeline by accident the weight of the pipeline will increase from 700 tons to 1,500-3,000 tons, above the ocean floor, which exceeds the capacity of any pipeline vessel in the world. How to face this situation when it happens?

2. During the production phase, if water or any liquid enters the pipeline, how to remove it? If liquids are not extracted gas will not come from the bottom of the pipeline to the surface. What kind of system will be used to remove water or liquids from inside the pipeline? There is no doubt that the production would be paralyzed. Have Messrs. Monteiro and Alfredo thought about these details? The devil is in the details.

3. If the pipeline falls to the sea bottom (during installation) how will it be lifted? The manufacturing of pipe will take three years. Should we wait another three years?

4. There is not a single system so far able to lay heavy pipelines in depths of 3000m. Alfredo and Monteiro, please say which one, and where?

5. The major problem is not based on slopes. It is based on the nature of the very rough terrain and very complex issues like depth, erosion and difficult bottom curvature.

FLNG

The FLNG is a new system that provides an alternative to the LNG Plant via the pipeline. I don’t know if Alfredo and Monteiro follow the news about the impact of the FLNG in the gas industry. Prelude in Australia has begun construction, with capacity of four million metric ton a year (mta). PETRONAS in Sarawak (Malaysia) also has adopted an FLNG with 2 million mta capacity.

Recently Santos and Suez announced on 9 October they would use an FLNG at their Bonaparte field 250 km East of Bayu Undan and 250 km West of Darwin.

In relation to Abadi (Indonesia), near Sunrise, an FLNG will also be used, and likewise Brazil is also interested in using FLNG’s.
One important thing is: why do Santos and Suez not use the LNG Plant in Darwin with its value of $7 billion when the distance to it is about half the distance from Bayu Undan to Darwin. The ocean floor terrain there is favorable? Why do Santos and Suez prefer an FLNG?

I humbly ask Alfredo and Monteiro, and all the Timorese, to reflect in search for the answers.

In conclusion:

1. The LNG Plant in Beaco with all the South Coast Project will cost an additional $5-$10 billion;

2. If adopting an FLNG, Timor Leste would not spend a penny; in exchange it would get $13 billion in revenue;

3. It is far more secure for the Timor-Leste Government to adopt a system without risks, and without spending a penny;

Recommendations:

i. All Timorese should open their minds and tell the opportunists, of which some are in the Government, to first spend money for "people's stomachs". The South Coast Project only benefits Alfredo’s group with its 10% administration fees.

ii. Our Older Brother Xanana, it would be better if you looked for someone else to seek a quicker solution for Sunrise, because the Government needs the money. Alfredo and Monteiro do not have the competence as reality has demonstrated.

iii. People will not see the pipeline under the sea. It would be better to spend the money directly on people’s daily livelihood.