EU Letter Exposes UNDP Incompetence: SSR Project.

UNDP Says Project Complete. Donors Wait for Result. Govt Says UNDP Did Not Deliver.

Tempo Semanal has obtained a letter from the EU to the UNDP, dated 1 October 2010 regard UN Security Sector Reform project conducted by UNMIT and UNDP.

At 1300 pm 24 May 2011 Tempo Semanal called Ms. Mikiko Tanaka the Country Director for UNDP in East Timor for comment on the letter written to her from Mr. Costas Tsilogiannis Charge D’Afair of the European Union delegation in East Timor on 1 October 2010.

EU letter to UN

When TS ask UNDP Country Director Tanaka for comment she stated she was busy having lunch. When asked again Tanaka stated “I did not know what you are talking about, can you call me later?”

Several minutes later TS called Mr. Costas of the EU asking about the letter in which he and the EU outline concerns about the “Contribution Agreement IFS 2008/21-028 Security Sector Review in Timor-Leste – Capacity Development Facility EU Delegation to Timor-Leste comments to UNDP progress report.”

TS asked Mr. Costas about the letter to which Mr. Costas said he did write the letter. Mr. costas  said “some of the concerns have been answered”.  He also said the “project could have been better”. He said the UNDP and others made mistakes. He said he was unsatisfied with some parts of the the project.

When asked about how the UN misused funds to send people to meetings in Africa instead of trainings in Europe he said “before you publish, lets talk”.

At 4pm TS met with Mr. Costas on the EU Delegation HQ in Acait, Dili, in the old Indonesian army HQ.

Mr. Costas told TS “I wrote the letter because in mid 2010 the UN had still not spent 50% of the money given for the project.  The project started in December 2008 and had duration of 1 year and eight month. But by July 2010, after 16 months into 18 month project only 50% spent. Total budget $2 million."

Mr. Costas also said “After I sent the letter, they responded by speeding up by funding NGO research and establishing National Defence Institute.”

Mr. Costas says the Defence Institute is of concern because while it was established it does not have the staff, resources as required in the Contribution Agreement. This is because it was a rush job.  Also he pointed out that the Defence Institute was made in the wrong place because Ministry of Defence have new building under way in Fatuhada.  Mr. Costa questioned UNDP planning and execution of the multi-million dollar project.

Secretary State Defence Julio Tomas Pinto told TS “UNDP promised 5 staff for the Defence Institute, but until today they did not deliver”.  Pinto said “you can interpret if this is UN a lie or not.”

Mr. Costas said the Defence Institute was poorly implemented because of UN delays.

Some NGOs that got fund for research from the UN SSR project funded by the EU told TS that they were given less time than had been promised and forced into a rush job so that the UN could report to EU that money was spent.  When TS asked Mr. Costa if he knew this Mr. Costa was very surprised. But he said ”overall the project some was some satisfied and some unsatisfied result”.

Mr. Costas said “project has finished but we are still waiting for the final report and for the UN to return money that was not used.”

TS spoke with Secretary State Security Fransisco Guterres the Chairman of UN SSR project management board. Mr. Guterres said “final report has not been submitted, because East Timor’s government will not sign it before they release the Security Sector Survey report.” According to Mr. Guterres “the UN has not released this survey report because the UN does not agree with the contents of the report.” He said the “UN does not like the contents of the public opinion survey because the people say the work of PNTL is better than the work of the United Nations Police.”

Regarding the EU funded UN SSR project Mr. Guterres said “there are some unfinished job, but the project is finished”.

TS again tried to speak with UNDP Country Director Tanaka, but the UN Spokesperson Sandra Macguir said TS has to send question in writing first.   TS received from the UN Spokesperson Sandra Macguir an SMS text “Sorry Mikiko says project was completed including all activities noted in the letter.”

In the letter the EU says the UNDP did not report correctly the financial details for the project activity and costs.  The EU asked UNDP for new report as required by the contract.  Mr. Costas says he still waiting for report, but Ms. Mikiko says the job is done. Secretary State Defence and Secretary State Security say they are unsatisfied with the UN project.

Komplete letter below.

Secret UNMIT SSR Report Uncovered.

Tempo Semanal has obtained from sources close to the UNMIT / UNDP Security Sector review project a draft document public perceptions of security survey which UNMIT/UNDP have conducted as part of the review project.  


This project has been strong criticized many times by sources inside the Government, the UN itself, and the media.

Unreleased UN Security Survey

The survey of thousands of Timorese across 13 district was conducted by The Demographic Institute Faculty of Economics University of Indonesia (Contractor) under contract number Security Perception Survey (PS-­‐UNDP 007/2009).  Indonesian experts surveyed Timorese citizens on behalf of the United Nations to determine the perception on security in Timor-leste.


The survey report was submitted in April 2010 and has had secret ever since while UNMIT wait for Government to agree to release.


UN Peacekeeping Chief Alain Leroy will be in Dili next week to review UNMIT and Government performance.  This secret survey was not even mentioned in the UN Report to the Security Council (Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 21 September 2010 to 7 January 2011) in 25 January 2011 this year.


The survey is supposed to inform and support the final review document which the UN Report to the Security Council says in 


"Section 31 The finalization of the draft document on the comprehensive review of the security sector has been delayed. Currently, the Government and the Office of the President are reviewing the document, in consultation with UNMIT. While it appears unlikely that the document will be finalized in the near future, many of the elements identified in the draft document have already been addressed, as noted above (see para. 30), and, once finalized, it will serve as a useful reference document."


The UNMIT SSR appears to be falling.


The UN Security Survey can be found here, revealed to the readers by Tempo Semanal.


Introduction
Executive Summary
Chapter 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Chapter 2 OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATION OF THE SURVEY
Chapter 3 LITERATURE REVIEW 

Chapter 4 OVERALL APPROACH 

Chapter 5 RESPONDENTS’ PROFILE

Chapter 6.1 Safety and Security

Chapter 6.2 Perception on Police

Chapter 6.3 Perception on the Army

Chapter 6.4 Domestic Violence

Chapter 6.5 Application of the Law

Chapter 6.6 Land Ownership problems

Chapter 6.11 Poverty

Chapter 6.12 Private Sector Development

Chapter 6.13 Youth

Chapter 6.14 Law and Judiciary

Discussion

One researcher who wanted anonymity said to Tempo Semanal that the general citation method has strong suggestions of plagiarism. This quote is alot used (e.g.:  Belun, 2008; Chinn & Everett, 2008; CICR and FoLiman Ba Malu – Hakat Ba O.2004; Everett, 2009; La’oHamutuk, 9 October 2009; UNESCO, 2009).

Another analyst who who shown survey asked why no critical references were used. And another academic source asked why no indigenous reports used and called the survey report "irredeemable".

The Governments of Australia, Norway, Ireland and the EU funded the report.

Time for the UN to Withdraw from East Timor? (via theAtlantic.com)

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/12/time-for-the-un-to-withdraw-from-east-timor/68334/ 

It has been a tough couple of years for the United Nations Police and Security Sector Reform (SSR) projects in East Timor and it is not getting better. A new Crisis Group report examines the record and future of the United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT) as the UN Security Council prepares to reconsider the mission's mandate in February 2011. As the third largest UN policing mission in the world, it costs more than USD $200 million a year. It is now the longest serving mission in East Timor after being first deployed following the 2006 crisis. This crisis was precipitated and exacerbated by a politicized and dysfunctional security sector, resulting in street fighting between various elements of the military, police and armed civilian groups. Dozens of people were killed and 10% of the country's population displaced.

Much of UNMIT's raison d'etre mandated by the UN Security Council has been to reform, restructure, and rebuild the national police service -- the Policia Nacional de East Timor (PNTL) -- and to assist the government in conducting a broad participatory policy review of the security sector.

The Crisis Group report says that the UN mission in East Timor has failed in these tasks, and virtually all other observers concur with this position. It has neither reformed the Timorese national police service nor produced the required review on how the country's security sector might be overhauled. The national police remains institutionally weak, under resourced, and largely unaccountable to broad civilian authority. Furthermore, there are concerns on behalf of the international community that a blurring of responsibilities between the police and military could pose problems in the future. Crisis Group argues that the the Timorese have elected to chart their own course and that the large UN mission only serves to confuse rather than helps matters. It asserts that the mission's police component should be drawn down dramatically faster than currently intended, its Security Sector Reform unit closed, and that the UN should draw up plans to phase out the mission altogether.

The UN mission has poorly handled its mandate to assist in broader security sector reform and its efforts have been consistently rebuffed by the government. The review of the security sector intended to guide policy development remains unpublished four years later and at this stage its release would be irrelevant. The UN's stated goal of delineating the roles of the police and the army has been rejected by Timorese leaders in favour of bringing the two forces closer together to avoid rivalry. The security sector support unit of the mission should be closed.

While it is easy and at times popular to pour blame on the UN, the Timorese Government has made the decision to go it alone. Enabled by growing political confidence and a massive petro-dollar fueled 450% increase in the national budget over the past three years, the Timorese Government has elected to largely ignore the UN on matters relating to the reform of the security sector. Rather it has merged the police and military under a combined Ministry of Defence and Security, so as to minimize rivalry and build confidence. This sees a greater role for the military in internal affairs and traditionally civilian roles, as well as an ongoing role for paramilitary police units deemed necessary and appropriate by local authorities. Additionally, the government has elected to ignore the UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry's proposals on accountability for the 2006 violence choosing to dismiss calls for prosecutions, or via Presidential constituional prerogative, pardon those who were convicted.

Leaving should not be too much of a problem for the UN. Any objective review of the situation in East Timor reveals that the Timorese security institutions have been managing security in East Timor for the past three years, and not without some success. Where there have been problems, the presence of a large UN mission has only served to confuse matters, obscuring the fact that in reality Timorese authorities are in charge on the ground, if not yet according to the letter UN-Government agreements. Its time for the international community to let Timorese openly assume total responsibility for their future.

For years, one report after another has suggested that things are amiss in the UN's police reform, and security sector reform initiatives, and the parallel universe of the UN's Obrigado Barracks HQ in Dili. In a quick count, there are at least eighteen reports brimming with criticism since January 2008. The International Crisis Group first raised a red flag on SSR in January 2008 and later with a comprehensive public study of the Timorese national police in December 2009. A former UNMIT staffer filed a September 2008 thesis for York University full of his old employer's failings. In December 2008, the UN itself produced a confidential report, first leaked by Wikileaks, which spoke of "tremendous institutional gaps" in the police service.

The chorus only strengthened the following year. In February 2009, a guest blogger for the Lowy Institute called the SSR effort "lame." In May, the influential Centre for International Cooperation in New York wrote, "The United Nations - despite its mandated role in SSR - has become increasingly sidelined." In June, International Peacekeeping published an article concluding that "the UN mission was not accomplished, and much work remained to be done to build a fully competent national police institution." In August, the Timorese Secretary of State for Defence made a less than kind publicassessment of UN SSR efforts in East Timor. In September, another UNMIT staffer wrote in his MA thesis that the "UN mission has been constrained by a lack of prioritization of SSR, a poor understanding of SSR theory within the UN family and mission leadership as well as the legacy of the UN's past mistakes." In October, the New York-based Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF) described the fiction that is UN Police handover to local police. On 29 October a highly respected national NGO wrote a pummeling paper asserting poor UN performance and double standards in the justice and security sector.

The criticism grew louder this year. In January, the Geneva based Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) published a chapter by one respected observer suggesting "it was a lot of talk and no action". In February Janes Defence Weekly wrote a biting commentary, concluding "that handover ceremonies constitute achievements in UN reports to the Security Council, but again the extent of institutional reform achieved remains questionable." In the same month, an influential police reform expert with experience in East Timor, and close ties to the UN Police Division in New York, provided a forensic look into the reasons for police reform failure globally, and East Timor in particular. In May Canada's Security Sector Reform Monitor cast a long shadow over UN SSR efforts with a strong argument asserting that the UN and its SSR efforts have been marginalized. On 18 November, a local NGO was more than a little annoyed with UNMIT SSR gaffes about armed private security. In December a local newspaper suggested that UNPOL was not serious about dealing with prostitution. This same newspaper also a few days earlier reported that the UNMIT Security Sector Sector considered an under performer by a UN watchdog. As well as the ICG report this month, CPPF again weighed in calling UNMIT's SSR work a "disaster."

The UN is intent on wrapping up in East Timor by 2012, and the government wants it out then as well. But the failures in East Timor have broader lessons. The United Nations also has a range of much larger police reform/SSR projects underway in Haiti, Liberia, and South Sudan. These are bigger and much tougher places in comparison to Dili. They have problems that are exponentially larger in scale and degree than that which exists in East Timor. The lesson is that when it comes to something as profoundly difficult as security sector reform, the UN Security Council must keep in mind the limitations of UN peace operations and either scale up their commitment or just get out of the security reform game in post-conflict zones. Half-measure security and police reform is just not worthwhile.

Giving up on UN security reform missions altogether is neither likely nor entirely desirable if you believe the benefits of multilateralism. However, the UN needs to reassess its performance and close the policy versus practice gap in reviewing its operations. Much work has been done in developing a serious police reform and security sector reform doctrine in UN HQ, but that doctrine is not fully implemented on the ground. The United Nations is currently conducting a system-wide review of civilian capacity, expected to be completed by the first quarter of 2011. It will be instructive to see to what extent UN missions from across the world the lessons of far away East Timor.

Image: A United Nations soldier on guard in Dili. By Jewel Samad/AFP/Getty.

This article available online at:

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/12/time-for-the-un-to-withdraw-from-east-timor/68334/

Dezenvolvimentu Setor Defeza Neineik Maibe Hakat Tan Pasu Ida Ba Oin

Dili-Tempo Semanal, 22.12.2010

Governu Timor Leste hahu ohin loron 22/12/2010 estabelese ona Institutu Defeza Nasionál ida iha ministeiru Defesa ninia mahon. Sekreatriu do Estadu de Defeza DR. Julio Tomas pinto hafoin kua tiha fita sinal inaugurah ona institute refere iha ninia diskursu badak dehan, “instutu Defeza Nasional loloos ne’e, kursu hotu-hotu kona ba Defeza Seguransa iha rai barak mós halo Instituisaun ida ne’e, mais halo fatin keta-ketak, tanba ne’e mak ami husu ba UNDP, UNMIT sira ajuda ita, liu-liu servisu hamutuk ho Uniaun European, fasilita falidade ida ne’ebe ke temporariu ba ita.”

“Sira prepara komputadór, library, buat hotu-hotu. Ita sei loke ba publiku, ita nia estudante sira ne’ebe mak hakarak estuda i hatene liu kona ba parte seguransa defeza nian. Ne’e sentru ida, ne’ebe ke diak bele faselita sira. Tanba ita hotu hatene Universidade bara-barak iha Timor, ita estudante barak mak halo peskiza kona ba defeza segurasa.”

Objetivu ba harii Institutu ne’e importante liu-liu maka, “ita tenke fasilita sira, para sira mai iha ne’e. I Instituisaun ida ne’e nia atividade sei ba liu peskiza, kona ba defeza seguransa nian ho Negosiu Estranjeiru nian, i mós prepara rekursu iha tempu badak ou naruk ba Ofisiais F-FDTL sira.”

Tuir Lei organiku Defeza ninian katak institute ida ne’e sei ukun husi Diretor ida ne’ebe nomeia husi Ministru Defeza Seguransa ou Sekretariu Estadu ne’ebe sei konsulta ho F-FDTL.

Mas tuir DR. Julio Tomas Pinto katak agora daudauk ninia parte seidauk identifika ema ida atu kaer kna’ar ne’e. “Hau hanoin iha tinan oin, tama ba orsamentu foun, hau hanoin ita bele nomeia ona ema ruma sai diretór ba fatin ida ne’e, i ita nia ema sira ne’ebe back round estudus estratejiku ou defeza, sira bele mai servisu hamutuk iha ne’e, hanesan fó kontribuisaun ba dezenvolvimentu defeza seguransa nian iha ne’e,” espera Sekretariu estadu ne’e.

Daudaun ne’e orsamentu hotu-hotu ba funsionamentu Instutu ne’e mai husi UNDP, Uniaun Europea. “Ita so prepra fatin ida ne’e deit. Depois sira mai faselita ita. Orsamentu mai husi sira hotu,” dehan Julio Pinto.

Husi Parte Embaixadór Uniaun Europea, Juan Carlos Rey informa katak, “konstrusaun institutu defeza Nasionál refere durante fulan tolu ho valor orsamentu US 150. 000.”

Ceremonia ne’e hetan partisipasaun husi SRSG Amirah Haq ho ninia vice Finn, ulun boot husi seksaun UNMIT ninian, Reforma Setor Seguranca, embaixadores, komandante komponente Naval Pedro Klamar Fuik no konvidadus sira seluk. (ts)

Security Support and UNMIT: SSR Failure mixed with Misconduct

Esclusive Tempo Semanal-Dili, 03.12.2010

This newspaper report that UNMIT has according to the UN Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) failed in its security sector reform mission at great cost to the taxpayers in Australian, Norway and the EU.  It can also report that an audit also discovered that at least one UN staff signed an agreement with the Timorese Government not to cooperate with his employer in the provision of details of his advisory role in defence matters.

In 2006 UNMIT was mandated to provide assistance to the Government in the conduct of a comprehensive security sector review on the roles and responsibilities of the PNTL and F-FDTL as a result of the crisis of 2006.  UNMIT establish the Security Sector Support Unit (SSSU) in order to manage this review.  To date that review has not happened.


The International Crisis Group (Brussels), the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) New York, the Security Sector Monitor (Canada), and the influential Centre for International Cooperation (CIC) in New York have all been very critical of the SSSU and UNMIT.  One former UN staffs even criticised the review.


In 2009 the CIC stated that the "UN has lost the credibility necessary for the current Security Sector Review process to fulfill this role. Without committed support and cooperation from the government of Timor-Leste, the likelihood of undertaking a successful review – let alone one that will be politically implementable – is minimal."

Front page audit report

signature page audit report former SRSG UNMIT Atul Khare

This newspaper report that on 23/12/2009 the UN chief investigator and auditor submitted the "Audit Report, Management of the Security Sector Support Programme in UNMIT - UNMIT's Support to security sector review and reform in Timor-Leste has not been fully effective UNMIT AP2009/682/02 IAD".  Readers may access the entire report here.


The purpose of the audit was the assess the effectiveness of the SSSU in the conduct of its tasks in UNMIT.  The SSSU has approximately 14 internationals staffs costing the taxpayer approximately $3.1 million/year.  The SSSU also has $4 million in funding from the Norwegian, Australian and EU taxpayers.  These project funds were given to UNDP.  The Project document outlined here. The OIOS audit shows that the funds are largely wasted.


The audit had several findings.  Firstly it found that the SSSU and UNMIT have failed to established and coordinate good relationships with Government and other international actors. 


"The Mission is expected to coordinate its work with other partners in strengthening security institutions, but there was no consolidated or clear methodology and plan of action developed in collaboration with the Government and other national and internationals actors for the security sector reform.  Attempts by the Mission to agree its priorities with the Government did not achieve the desire results."


Secondly, the audit found that the SSSU failed to properly align with Government and that its staff failed to co-locate with Government counterparts, and that the Government failed to ask for SSSU staff input into security reform processes.


"The Government's lack of cooperation with and interest in UNMIT's support, and the Mission's failure to conduct the required reassessment of its staffing needs for the security support program, resulted in the under utilization of advisers recruited by the Mission.  Only two of the eight advisers on-board were co-located with their counterparts and many advisers complained that the Government did not request for their input into reforms initiatives".


Thirdly, the audit found that the Mission "Mandate Implementation Plan" (MIP) for the SSSU was never implemented as the Government never cooperated with it.  The MIP can be found here.


"According to the Mission the Government did not respond to its request for the Government's views on the draft MIP and the proposed role of the SSSU".


The audit also found that the UNPOL Rebuild Restructure and Reform plan for the PNTL was never endorsed by the Government or the PNTL.  As a result it is clear that the UNPOL have been following on plan since 2006, while the Government have been following their own plan.

UNPOL RRR plan never adopted

As in the below it shows that UNMIT SSSU failed to perform its role as many tasks remain unperformed - despite millions of dollars being expended.  The Review project, the capacity building and the security survey costing millions have yet to occur even 11 months after the UN OIOS found out that they had not happened as of Dec 2009. To read the multi-million dollar project document of the project "that never happen", see here, signed by SRSG Atul Khare and PM Gusmao.

Key tasks costing millions of dollars never done.

Staff Misconduct in the SSSU:


This newspaper can report that a UN adviser in the Office of the Secretary of State for Defence SoSD, "signed a confidentiality document stating that he would not share any information he gained in the office of the SoSD with any party, including the UN".  The audit states that this is a clear breach of UN staff rules Regulation 1.1(b) and that as a staff accountable to the UN and should therefore be "personally accountable for violating UN Staff regulation 1.1(b)."  This newspaper can report that the staff member has been working for the UN in Timor-leste in the defence sector since at least 2005.  The audit states that UNMIT has only cautioned the staff member in question, but seems to still have employment with the UN in the same role. 

UN Staff signs secrecy agreement with the Government of Timor-Leste

When called by this newspaper the Chief of the Security Sector Support Unit, Mr. Murray Mccullough, declined to comment other than stating that "all the audits recommendations have been complied with".  A reading of the audit report shows that this is not accurate.


On 2 December Mr. Gorgy Kakuk responded to this newspaper's request for comment on (and in some cases copies of) United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, by stating that, 


"OIOS reports contain confidential and sensitive information about individuals and United Nations operations and activities. Disclosure of such information may be detrimental to the Organization’s proper functioning, the welfare and safety of its staff or third parties, or may violate the Organization’s legal obligations. OIOS reports are therefore considered strictly confidential internal United Nations documents.  For these reasons, the release of reports for purposes other than to facilitate the disciplinary process is restricted to specific instances provided for under the OIOS mandate, as per global UN policy. Thank you, again, for your letter." 

Tempo Semanal report that the United States Government and the United States Mission to the United Nations in New York are of a different opinion that Mr. Gorgy Kakuk and disagree with UN Global Policy.  In the ongoing effort to reform the United Nations the United States Permanent Mission to the UN in New York recently posted on its website over 200 OIOS reports from 2008-2010.

This newspaper will continue examing OIOS reports on UNMIT in the next weeks.

Fundasaun Mahein Husu Ema Atu Tau Matan ba Orsamento MDS.

Today Fundasaun Mahein (FM) published a report on the budget of the Ministry of Defence an Security.  FM is the first Timorese NGO dedicated to looking at the Security Sector in Timor-Leste.

FM has written many reports on the security sector in Timor-Leste.  In less than one year it has written more on the Timorese security sector in a local language that the $5 million dollar UNMIT Security Sector Support Unit or UNPOL has produced.  

It is by Timorese, for Timorese about the Timorese security sector.  

While the report contains errors it is informative.  This report examines the budget for the institutions which provide safety and security to Timorese citizens.  It poses many questions which Timorese citizens might want want to consider.

Certainly, it is surprising to Tempo Semanal that one office in the Office of the Secretary of State for Security (SES) receives nearly $150,000 USD / year but its very unclear what it actually does.  Ita Hein.

Atu hetan FM nian relatorio iha lian Tetun click iha ne'e, ka hare sira nia website.

Tenente Koronel Horta

DR. Loro Horta daudaun ne'e servisu hanesan Progrma manajer ba UNDP iha area Reforma setor seguranca (SSR). Rui Castro kritika Presidenti da Republika hodi dehan ne'e hanesan konflitu de Interese ida no so'e viadas hasoru ema numeru um iha nasaun ne'e hodi dehan, "se maka ko'alia barak liu nia maka halo barak liu." Rui ko'alia bu'at ne'e bainhira haree ai kapelak boboot taka lemo iha Dili laran ho prezidenti ninia letratu no lia menon atu kompate KKN. Rui dehan emboot hotu-hotu ne'ebe tuur iha instituisaun de Estadu sempre foo uluk prioridade ba ninia maluk sira. "Ha'u hanoin bu'at ne'e la'os foun ba ita maibe bain-bain ona," dehan Rui Castro.  Tuir observasaun Castro katak departamentu barak ukun tuir apalidus ninian.
Tempo Semanal foin deskobre lista ne'ebe hasai husi Centru estudu ba Asia Pasifiku  (Asia Pasifik Centre for Security Study)  ne'ebe ninia baze iha Hawaii hasai lista ida hodi hatudu katak DR. Loro Horta ne'ebe ninia naran kompletu Maubere L. S. da Silva Horta agora mos sai ona hanesan Tenete Koronel ba Guarda Kostal Timor Leste Maiske nasaun ne'e rasik seidauk kreia ninia guarda Kostal.

SSR in Timor-Leste.

Reforming the Security Sector :

Facing Challenges, Achieving Progress in Timor Leste
Júlio Tomás Pinto*

The idea to write the present article came about when I read the report by the investigation team assembled by the Government to study the "Maliana Case", the letter dated 3 July 2009 to the Prime Minister by the Representative of the Secretary General of the UN in Timor-Leste, Dr Atul Khare, on human rights violations by PNTL and the F-FDTL, and the report on the unilateral investigation carried out by UNPOL on this matter. My purpose in writing this article is to encourage a reflection on the approach taken by foreign personalities, agencies or countries in Timor-Leste regarding the reform of the security sector. Also, I am often puzzled with the carelessness displayed by many foreign reviewers who assess our work.

I ask the agencies listed in this article to take my words as food for thought rather than negative criticisms. I trust this article will contribute to strengthening cooperation between Timor-Leste and other countries, as well as between Timor-Leste and the UN.

The State of Timor-Leste, through the President of the Republic, the President of the National Parliament and the Prime-Minister, created last year a strictly Timorese team called Group for the Reform and Development of the Security Sector. It is expected that the Reform of the Security Sector will enable the development and consolidation of the existing agencies, so that they may perform their tasks with efficiency, legitimacy and accountability, thereby ensuring safety to all citizens. It would do well to remind that this reform of the Security Sector is directly linked to the Government's policy concerning the development of its Program. This is why the Group for the Reform of the Security Sector was assembled in the first place. As such, the team is coordinated by two Secretaries of State, namely the Secretary of State for Security and the Secretary of State for Defence.

The said team has been doing an excellent job along with the advisor to the President of the Republic, Dr Roques Rodrigues. The so-called High Level Meetings on the Reform of the Security Sector, where issues concerning the Reform of the Security Sector are debated, involve the President of the Republic, the President of the National Parliament and the Prime Minister, in addition to the two Secretaries of State and some advisors. The UN has also put together a team to support Timor-Leste regarding the Reform of the Security Sector, under the cooperation agreement with the Government of Timor-Leste signed in June 2008. Despite positive reviews by some friends who think the program has been developing for the past year, I do believe that they do not have a Security Sector Reform implementation program. I feel that this is due to the fact that the UN only takes part in the context of "assistance" in conformity with is mandate, which would be important to understand in terms of a peacekeeping vs. peacebuilding dualistic analysis. Indeed, during this period the UN team has held a seminar, placed advisors at the Ministry of Defence and Security in a unilateral manner and has been carrying out mentoring and retraining actions in the PNTL. It seems that the mandate of the UN is only to work alongside with the Secretary of State for Security, particularly with the PNTL. Effectively, in the Sector of Defence it seems that they only work alongside us to speak about training in Human Rights, separation between the roles of the Police and of the Military, advisors and Military Liaison officer training. I myself have requested them to provide training to the F-FDTL in terms of Peacekeeping Forces, but so far no plan has been submitted to us.

When I, in my capacity as Secretary of State for the Defence, meet with a representative from the UN or any country, I tell them two things: firstly, that advisors must present me (in my capacity as Secretary of State and Timorese citizen) several options, as well as their negative and positive implications, so that I may make my decision. This means that no advisor can present me a single option and ask me to follow it, claiming it is the only possible choice.

If on one hand we live in the age of globalization, where the classic concept of State sovereignty has become dimmed, as a result of the need for transparency, cooperation and even the right of interference, where the Timorese sovereignty is limited to the Flag and the National Anthem, as well as some gestures of courage to make decisions without pressure by other States, on the other hand Timor-Leste is a small country but is nevertheless a sovereign State. Consequently its position in relation to any issue has the same value as that of any other State. Accordingly, other States must respect Timor-Leste as the sovereign Nation that it is.

Secondly, I always tell them that the development of the Sector of Defence must be based on bilateral cooperation. This is important for Timor-Leste to be able to set the military system format it wants to establish. This format surely does not include a myriad of different training actions provided by various countries. Should this come to pass, I do not know what the Timorese military system would become. This is why the F-FDTL command has decided that presently the basic military training provided is to be based on the Portuguese system, which is in accordance with the NATO standards, with the possibility of specialized training being based on the systems of other countries. The purpose of this is to provide uniform training so as to enable an efficient Timorese military system in the future. This is preferable to having each country implement its system in the F-FDTL, which would create considerable confusion.

Until 2007 Timor-Leste did not have a National Defence Law and there was no legal diploma approving the Organic of the Military Police. These are just two examples within the scope of legislative drafting. In this field, and in relation to the Sector of Defence, the Government is not required to announce what it is doing or to report to the UN. Nevertheless, we can summarize the reforms completed up until now:

Firstly, at a legislative level, we can highlight the Decree-Law approving the Organic of the Ministry of Defence and Security, the Draft National Security Law regulating the cooperation between the PNTL, the F-FDTL and Civil Protection, the revision of the Military Service Law and the Decree-Law on its regulation, the Draft National Defence Law and the Remuneration Regime for the F-FDTL; currently being prepared we have the Legal Regime for the Retirement of Soldiers, the Military Programming Law, the Military Justice Code and the Decree-Law on the Promotion to General in the F-FDTL. This Decree-Law is important because there have not been promotions from lieutenant-colonel to general for nine (9) years. Finally, the Secretariat of State for Defence, according to the Government Program, is preparing the necessary changes to the Defence Policy, in order to enable the implementation of the National Defence Law proposed to the Parliament.

Secondly, at a structural level, we highlight that the organic law of the Ministry of Defence and Security enables a clear distinction between the political level of defence and security, as a structure constituted by the Minister of Defence and Security, from the military level of the F-FDTL, as well as the autonomous structure that is the National Defence Institute (NDI).

Thirdly, at a training level, we highlight the definition of a Training System and Concept and the drafting of the new Employment Concept for the F-FDTL.

Fourthly, at an administrative level, the Secretariat of State for Defence has already achieved some goals, consubstantiating the legislative drafting process, particularly in changing the concept of recruitment from a mandatory to a voluntary one, improving the subsidies to the F-FDTL, improving the promotion regime for soldiers, implementing the Remuneration System for Soldiers and reviewing the size and capacity building required for the human resources of the Secretariat of State for Defence.

Fifthly, we must highlight the importance given by the Government to F-FDTL infrastructures and equipment. This is a relevant aspect, as previously FALINTIL worked in Aileu beneath canvases. Even when they were moved to Dili they continued to work in containers, and after the 2006 crisis they were transferred to Tasi Tolu, where they continued to work in containers. As such, it was considered important to repair the Military Training Centre of Metinaro. Also in relation to infrastructures, the Government requested financial assistance from China in order to construct the Headquarters and the Building for the Ministry of Defence. In conformity with this, the Chinese Government presented six months ago the project for the Headquarters and the Building for the Ministry of Defence to the Secretary of State for Defence, which was approved by the latter. Therefore the Headquarters for the F-FDTL is scheduled for construction in 2010. Furthermore, this bilateral cooperation with China will also include the construction of 100 houses for F-FDTL members starting next September.

Within the scope of infrastructures, the Government of Timor-Leste has already allocated an amount in last year's budget for constructing Warehouses, the Military Police Building and the Metinaro Armoury.

In addition to this, and according to a review made by Timor-Leste in relation to information on the problem caused by the entry of an enormous number of illegal fishermen in the Timor Sea, the Government has decided to acquire two patrol vessels from the Chinese company Poly Technology. In fact, the previous Government already had plans to purchase patrol vessels. In 2006 the Government had allocated a sum of 10 million dollars for purchasing the vessels, one million dollars for training and three hundred thousand dollars for fuel, but these amounts were suddenly removed by the 2006 mid-year budget. In 2007, responding to a letter by the F-FDTL, the then Prime Minister Dr José Ramos-Horta stated in a dispatch that the vessels might be acquired in 2008. The purpose of purchasing the vessels is firstly to provide resources to the F-FDTL, the Naval Component and other bodies. Secondly it seeks to enable control of the Timor Sea along with neighbouring countries, especially in the South Coast. Politically it seems positive for Timor-Leste to buy these two vessels.

In relation to bilateral cooperation, agreements were signed with Portugal and Canada. Timor-Leste is also discussing and reviewing agreements with Australia, Indonesia and other States wishing to cooperate with Timor-Leste.

Portugal and Australia are two particularly important States for Timor-Leste, as the existing reports indicated that they are the ones who invest more in our country's defence. We have always received support from Portugal, even during the Resistance.

The Portuguese support to Timor-Leste is based on a Technical and Military Cooperation Agreement that includes, inter alia, support through the provision of advisors to the Training Centre of Metinaro, the Naval Component in Hera and to the F-FDTL Headquarters. Presently a Portuguese Language Centre is being established in Metinaro. Portugal is also assisting in the assessment for border demarcation and maritime authority system for Timor-Leste. In addition, they are providing funding for the maintenance of the two vessels they previously offered to Timor-Leste. They have also offered training opportunities in Portugal for sergeants and officers.

Military cooperation with Australia is also very good. We should highlight Australia's assistance to Timor-Leste through the DCP (Defence Cooperation Program). A clear example of this is the Military Training Centre of Metinaro, where almost all the investment comes from Australia. On 17 April 2008 Timor-Leste and Australia held a forum called Defence Cooperation Talks, where both countries agreed on assistance to the construction of an armoury for the F-FDTL and to the construction of a Specialized Training Centre in the Training Centre of Metinaro. So far, however, only the latter has been completed.

On 26 June 2009 Timor-Leste and Australia met again within the scope of the Defence Cooperation Talks in order to review the 2008 Project and the new projects for 2010. Speaking for myself, I was happy to see that Australia wishes to continue providing assistance to Timor-Leste.

Cooperation with the United States of America is also clearly positive. On 18 August Dili will host a Military Conference between Timor-Leste and the United States of America, also designated as USA-Timor-Leste Bilateral Military Conference. Cooperation is also favourable with the US Command in the Pacific, and we find some agreement points for working together.

The experience with the United States of America has been a positive one, as almost all their activity in Timor-Leste has been approved by the Government, corroborating the idea that, as a sovereign State, any activity done by a foreign State, including the United States of America, must be authorized by the Timorese Government. Accordingly, the sending of US Navy vessels to carry out training exercises in our territory under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), existing between both countries since 2003, requires authorization by Timor-Leste. As such, and since the US plan foresees that 3,000 US marines will travel to Timor-Leste, it would be desirable for these training exercises to take place in coordination with the F-FDTL, in order to enable transfer of knowledge to the Timorese forces.

Once more, although Timor-Leste is a small State, it is nevertheless a sovereign Nation in the World, as evidenced by the cooperation ties it has built, including with neighbouring Indonesia. Indeed, in addition to the countries listed above, Timor-Leste has also improved its relationship with Indonesia. After the visit by the Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão and his entourage to Indonesia in 2008, this country allowed for the first time F-FDTL officers to attend the SESKO Angkatan Laut TNI in Surabaya. In 2010 the F-FDTL will send a senior officer to Jakarta, in order to attend the LEMHANNAS (National Defence Institute of Indonesia) in Jakarta. Furthermore, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak has already invited the Chief of the Defence Force of Indonesia to visit Timor-Leste later this year.

Regarding this matter, which is a recurrent one since we cooperate with so many countries, it is important to understand that we do not want to become militarily dependent from other States. This is why we believe it is convenient to cooperate with various countries in the World. As such we have a rather positive relationship with Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific islands and the ASEAN countries. We also have healthy relationships with China, the United States of America, Indonesia, Portugal and so many other countries.

Out of the several activities already mentioned, I would like to highlight the importance to Timor-Leste of the National Security Law and the National Defence Law, as they regulate the role of the President of the Republic as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, as well as the connection between the F-FDTL and the Secretary of State for Defence, the Prime Minister, the National Parliament and other holds of high public bodies. This is a particularly important matter as it helps the Government to "prevent anyone from politicizing the F-FDTL and prevent the F-FDTL to interfere in politics". Indeed, it strengthens the constitutional idea that the Armed Forces must be nonpartisan, according to the principle that "the F-FDTL understand politics but must not participate in political meetings or display their political convictions". I should stress that I learned a great deal during my work with the F-FDTL, as the commanders told me "not to give them anything that they were not supposed to do". This expression serves to show in a clear manner the justification for separating politics from the military establishment.

The National Security Law is also indispensible because it regulates cooperation between the F-FDTL, the PNTL and Civil Protection in emergency situations. In fact, the Organic Law of the Ministry of Defence and Security, which has already been approved, foresees an Integrated Crisis Management Centre. Therefore we must be organized to provide assistance to the population in emergency situations, e.g. caused by some natural disaster. Although I have received no such official information, rumours have it that the National Security Law is not appreciated by the UN, as they say it militarizes the police. I hope that this information is not accurate.

After receiving that information from some Timorese citizens, I told them that foreigners always think that what Timor-Leste does is wrong. Only others do things right. There are events from which we can conclude that Timor is always wrong and the UN is always right! Let us consider the crisis caused by the attack on the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. Some of the distinguished gentlemen of the UN conveyed to the media that the Timorese were in charge of security. Perhaps they forgot that so far there are two Police Commanders, one from the PNTL and the other from the UNPOL. And it is the UNPOL Commander who is in charge! It was only recently that responsibility was turned to the PNTL in three districts, namely Lospalos, Oecussi and Mantuto.

Let us consider another situation. When the Joint Command travelled to the airport to receive the petitioners arriving from Oecussi and the F-FDTL showed up with the weapons they had brought from the KKO HQ, the UNPOL drafted a report stating that the F-FDTL had threatened them with large calibre weapons. The inaccuracy of this report indicates that the authors forget that in a situation of martial law the military must always be prepared, in what one might call a "state of readiness".

Let us now consider the review of the recent events in Maliana. UNPOL presented a report stating that the F-FDTL breached human rights and threatened Philippine elements of the UNPOL by pointing weapons at their chests. After the High Level Meeting with the President of the Republic, the Government assembled a team to investigate the Maliana events. The team consisted of two officers from the State Ministry, Lieutenant-Colonel Koliati from the F-FDTL and Lieutenant Niki from the Military Police, international advisor Chandrabaland for the Secretariat of State for Defence, Inspector Domingos from the PNTL and Dr Anacleto Ribeiro from the Secretariat of State for Security. The investigation concluded that there was no indication of F-FDTL members having "pointed weapons at the chests of UNPOL members". As such it would seem that UNPOL presented an inaccurate report of the Maliana events, which can only serve the purpose of bringing discredit to the F-FDTL. However, the negative campaign to damage the image of F-FDTL continues. Notwithstanding the report from the investigation team, an article appeared in the Worldpoliticsreview.com entitled "East Timor: Security Sector Relapse?" in which it stated that "the domestic security situation improves in the months thereafter, but the police remained sub-ordinate to the army, which still involves itself in the internal security. According to eyewitnesses, UN Police attempts to intervene in a public order incident in Maliana in June 2009 near the Indonesian border, resulted in F-FDTL guns being pointed at the multinational Forces".

More recently, there was another case in the bar called "Casa Minha". Let us make a more detailed analysis of the event. Information from the police agent who was the victim and the youths who witnessed the event, affirmed that two drunken GNR members beat up the PNTL agent until he fell and for this reason the PNTL agent shot at the wheels of the GNR vehicle. UNPOL makes a report stating that the PNTL agent carried a pistol into the bar and fails to mention the intoxicated state of the GNRs.

This fact warranted the intervention of the PNTL General Commander, Longuinhos Monteiro, who strongly protested to the UNPOL Commissioner, Luís Miguel Carrilho who is from Portugal. Longuinhos Monteiro affirmed that "I ask that the two GNR members who beat up my agent be investigated thoroughly" (STL, 13 July 2009). What is known is that up until now the GNR members have been listed as unknown. Only more recently has there been an investigation initiated on this case, however, UNPOL has already issued a suspension notice to the victim, Police Agent Fransisco Magno HAU, while on the ather hand the GNR from UNPOL who beat up the victim are still free.

In relation to this case, the Portuguese newspaper Correio da Manha (16 July 2009), published inaccurate information in their article "Xanana's security leads an attack against the GNR" and the newspaper Noticias Lusofonia (16 July 2009) printed an article entitled "Xanana's Security Accused of Attacking Portuguese Military".

This is not the first time the GNR and UNPOL have violated human rights. We have the case of the PNTL agent, Constantino de Carvalho who was beaten up by the GNRs until he fell. We have the case of the Baucau PNTL Commander, Adérito Ximenes, whom the UNPOL accused of committing human rights violations against one of their members, but in the end, the Court of Appeal decided in favour of Commander Adérito and determined that the UNPOL member was wrong. We also have the case of the UIR Commander, Agostinho Gomes, whose intervention was aimed at resolving an incident at Manleuana Dili, however UNPOL accused him of human rights violations. Of course the UN wants to defend its reputation as UNPOL or UN but it forgets that it is not a "perfect" institution. If it had been a PNTL or F-FDTL member who was drunk and had beaten up others, perhaps the UN would have moved heaven and earth to produce a report in which they would have written a great deal on human rights. We always hear that alcohol, women and playing with guns do not go well together as they represent a security threat. On this matter we are all in full agreement as long as it does not apply only to the Timorese. In Australia, the military also apply this principle. But it seems that perhaps it does not apply to the UN! It is necessary to understand the fact that each of the interventions from each of the UNPOL countries has been uncoordinated and each has acted as they wanted.

The PNTL General Commander, Longuinhos Monteiro, is currently working to repair all that. What we do know is that if we compare the character, self-confidence and performance of some PNTL members with some UNPOL members, ours are much better. UNPOL members are controlled by politicians from their countries but they still want to teach our PNTL that they are better professionals than we.

CONCLUSION: We all move according to the principle of "wanting to do what we (Timor Leste) want, rather than what others want". Although Timor-Leste is a small country, we have our own history, conveyed from generation to generation. As such, the Timorese must be able to choose between foreign opinions, since it would be unwise to follow those that merely seek to serve the interests of those countries.

Despite the negative aspects of international cooperation listed above, this cooperation is still extremely important and requires better coordination between Timorese authorities, the UN and foreign experts so that the Security Sector Reform project can move forward. However, this requires honesty by all. The UN and we must think on how we can improve things.

All of us who work on reforming the Security Sector have the strong support of the President of the Republic, the President of the National Parliament and the Prime Minister, seeking to enable the proper reform of the Security Sector of Timor-Leste. Here we should highlight the contributions of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, who have always given us the utmost support in order for us to be able to apply that which is written in the Constitution of the Republic.

Finally, under the principle of "we (Timor Leste) do it because we (Timor Leste) want to follow universal values, not because others tell us to", meaning that "we (Timor Leste) want to do what we (Timor Leste) want, rather than what others want", it is important to understand that the experience of other States should be just a reference to us, rather than trying to reproduce it. If we all want to implement the ideal concept of security sector reform, it is important to understand that it will necessarily take its time, as only so can we find what is good for Timor-Leste.

*Secretary of State for Defence

Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste