THE EMILIA AND ALFREDO PIRES HEGEMONY OVER PROJECTS SUCH AS G7 AND TACI MANE

Vicente Maubocy 

OOPINION By Vicente Maubocy

Sister and brother Emilia and Alfredo Pires are trying to inscribe their names in the history of Timor-Leste through G7 or Taci Mane-like projects. They are very good at using opportunities (opportunists) and also at using other people’s sweat and effort (parasites). They sit in in their air conditioned offices and homes, did not spend any time campaigning, and suddenly they have the good fortune of becoming Finance Minister and Minister of Petroleum, their fate arising from Xanana’s big name, according to the “law of the least effort”.

The Melbourne Mafia is very smart when building their structure and putting together their people, and they dominate the Vth Constitutional Government for their own long term self- interest. In this case, the strategic positions are Finance Minister to manage the Government funds, Petroleum Minister, as petroleum is where the government gets all its money, the President of the Council of Ministers, this being the place where important agendas are elaborated and discussed and decisions at high level made, in a way totally controlled by the Melbourne Club Mafia. The Melbourne Club Mafia is aware of our Older Brother’s weaknesses, which helps them achieve their objectives. Facts and evidence will expose their maneuvers and manipulations.

Let’s analyze the trajectories of the Melbourne Club Mafia

Emilia Pires, as the Finance Ministry from 2007 onwards, tried to appropriate the G7 group for her personal projects, showing her performance inside Timor-Leste as well as outside. Inside Timor-Leste, she tried to convince Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao to trust her so that she could impose her personal self-interested views as well as her cronies’ of the Melbourne Club. In that view, she tried to manipulate and dominate economic strategic sectors such as Finance and Petroleum and to manage the Petroleum Fund.

She attempted to convince the International Community through the World Bank Financial Institution. Her strategy for obtaining the trust of the World Bank is to use the flag of the fight against poverty through the institution of G7 so that in the end she could one day become a World Bank manager. She wants to emulate Sri Mulyani, a former Finance Minister from Indonesia, who became a World Bank manager. Emilia is confident that she could use G7 as a springboard to get acquainted with Ban Ki Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, and get nominated to the world class United Nations Millennium Development Goals Panel. AgioPereira, as the spokesman of Government, releases communiques in praise of Emilia Pires while other members of Government that do not belong to their group do not receive any attention despite their achievements.

In the worst cases of manipulation of the decisions of the Council of Ministers, the final version sent to the President of the Republic for publication in the Journal of the Republic is contrary to the decision. There are many examples, such as when the Government decided to lease the SAPT building to ENSUL for 99 years and the then Minister of Justice expressed his desire to re- examine the issue, which was not authorized by Agio Pereira. The same thing happened about the appointment of the temporary Chairman of the Board of RTTL, Esposito Ximenes, whose mandate was supposed to be for the duration of the Government only and a new Chairman should have been appointed by the new Government: in reality, it was learned later that the appointment of Mr. Esposito Ximenes had been recorded in the Journal of the Republic for a four year mandate.

Manipulations by Emilia Pires

Emilia Pire’s actions have demonstrated her ambition: to add the Foreign Affairs Minister’s portfolio to her own Finance Minister portfolio. According to the constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, the mission of the Foreign Affairs Minister is to execute the external affairs policies. A few years ago the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Zacarias Albano da Costa had a confrontation with Emilia Pires and big boss Agio Pereira of the Melbourne Club, involving Xanana. Emilia Pires had lobbied an Indian IT Training Institute to accept students from Timor. It appeared later that the Institute had no international recognition. More seriously, Emilia Pires sent her Director General for Cooperatives to sign an agreement, in violation of state protocol: in the case of a treaty between nations, in absence of the Minister, only the Vice-Minister is entitled to sign. Director General Santina Cardose was made Vice Minister and the decision was forced on old man Xanana.

In this Vth Constitutional Government, Jose Luis Guterres doesn’t have any power as foreign Affairs Minister, he doesn’t execute any foreign affairs policies, he just attends to meetings and establishes agendas according to Amelia’s strategic interests. Amelia Pires grasped the role of Foreign Minister so that she could solve the problems of the world and implement her ambitions with regards to the G7. Inside the country, Emilia Pires and Agio Pereira use Xanana’s influence to fulfill their own economic objectives. For all things, the final decision is theirs. For example, recently, before the formation of the Vth Government, they were not part to the electoral campaign efforts, but although the CNRT Party Structure was the one to really work hard, in the end it was not involved in the decision making to form the Government. The ones who decided were Agio Pereira, Emilia Pires, and the Melbourne Club.

Dionisio Babo is nominally the Secretary General of CNRT, but in reality the Secretary General is Agio Babo, advised by Emilia Pires. The list of cabinet candidates that was presented to Xanana was elaborated by Agio Pereira and Emilia Pires of the Melbourne Club. 

The list of candidates

prepared by the Executive Structure of CNRT did not even reach Xanana. This shows that the Melbourne Club tries hard to isolate Xanana from the structure of CNRT.

The composition of the Vth Government clearly shows that the Melbourne Club Mafia is consolidating its power through enhanced portfolios: Agio Pereira, Minister of State, President of the Council of Ministers, Emilia Pires, Finance Minister with a portfolio reinforced by that of the former Economy and Development Minister, Joao Goncalves, and Alfredo Pires, promoted from Secretary of State to Minister, thus gathering the power to make all the decisions for the big projects of Taci Mane, Greater Sunrise, etc. The Melbourne Club Mafia installed their people in all the key positions of the economy: Petroleum Fund Manager at the Finance Ministry, ANP, Timor GAP, FCDH, CNA, etc. The Melbourne Club also tried to obtain $200 million more for the budget by using the Petroleum Fund and financial operations on the international market. Emilia Pires with her Melbourne Club Mafia has also installed her agents in all Ministries and more importantly in the Cabinet of the Prime Minister where a strategy was elaborated to ensure that their messages reach the Prime Minister at the appropriate time. Before meeting with the Prime Minister to impose their plans, Emilia Pires, Alfredo Pires and Agio Pereira first call Elizabeth Esposto to inquire whether “the Prime Minister is in a good mood or not”. If Elizabeth says “the Prime Minister is in a god mood”, then they go and see Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao. A concrete result is the Hera port and there are many more.

Emilia Pires, Alfredo Pires, Agio Pereira and their Melbourne Club Mafia enjoy a special treatment: for example, only just recently, before the Budget Ratification, all members of government had to stay in Timor to discuss the issue. However, the Melbourne Club could enjoy their holiday abroad, instead of staying home to discuss the Budget Ratification.

The Budget Ratification wasn’t obtained yet that Agio Pereira went overseas, and Alfredo Pires and his Melbourne Club spent the holidays in Bali, at Nusa Dua, while other Members of Government were in Parliament, responding to Parliamentarian criticism.

Emilia Pires manages to impose her desires and ambition to appropriate G7 in order to promote herself so that one day she can obtain a position of responsibility within some international financial institution. She takes advantage of Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao and other available resources, technical and financial, at her office to promote her activities at G7 level. Helder da Costa is the intellectual PhD and the Master of Ceremonies to promote Emilia Pires’ image, prestige and name within international financial institutions, so that one day she can develop some career at the World Bank.

Evidence of these self-promotional efforts is to be found in the “Four Corners” program of Australian ABC on October 1st, 2012. She showed herself on television, discussing tax matters related to Bayu Undan, claiming that ConocoPhillips owed $3 billion in back taxes. I have the feeling that this is some big absurdity. Why did she not wake up until now? Five years in the job and Emilia Pires’ and Alfredo Pires’ teams were not interested in the matter until now? Didn’t the tax teams of the Ministry of Finance and the accounting team of ANP monitor the production quantities weekly, monthly and yearly? More ironically, upon inquiring ourselves with ANP in the past, we found the data there were absolutely inconsistent. When we inquired about the correct data from the Australian Resource Department, we were told that ANP was in charge of all that information (big confusion).

Later on, a lady from the Australian Resource Department came to visit Emilia Pires and when she inquired about production quantities, Emilia said: “I don’t know!” (big absurdity). She should have said: “I don’t know the exact quantities but however I will let you know after I consult with the relevant division”. This shows Emilia Pires is a “dimwit”.

Alfredo flew to Suai in a UN helicopter with the ABC reporter to make propaganda for his mega project, Taci Mane. They then went to Hera to show the Power Plant and he said that the pipeline from Sunrise would supply the gas for the Power Station. More ridiculously, Alfredo promoted the Hera Power Plant as his own project, within his portfolio. According to regulation, he should have invited Januario Pereira, the Secretary of State for Electricity, to accompany him, as this project belongs to Januario’s Department.

I asked Januario about the visit and he said: “Brother, I didn’t know”. I told Januario: “you must be careful with the Melbourne Club Mafia, we will end up like headless chicken”. Also, “we cleared the land, sowed the seeds, harvested the crop, took the crop to the house and cooked, after which the Melbourne Club Mafia stole all the food from us. They eat and are satisfied, but we only have air to fill our bellies and by the end of the day we will be sick”.

I have no idea how Alfredo will bring the gas from Beaco to Hera. Which means of transportation will he use? Pipeline? Ships? Trucks? From the way it looks his concept is not very clear. How can Alfredo achieve success? I have a lot of doubt about Alfredo’s capacity to carry out his Taci Mane project. In the next article, I will describe in detail all the reasons why the Taci Mane Project will not succeed, so that readers can appreciate the issues and make their own assessments.

Practice is the criterion of truth, acts derive from thinking. From their behavior, I am convinced that the Melbourne Mafia now in the Vth Government dominates the strategic sectors of Finance, Petroleum and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, with their own agenda about all the important national issues. I can see that some members of the Vth Government are clever, but they don’t have the courage to counter the Melbourne Club Mafia.

How can we fight the manipulations of the Melbourne Club Mafia?

This is the responsibility of all, Parliamentarians, Politicians, Academics, Businesspeople: all together we have the strength to destroy it.

Community Based Policing: The factors that influence Police Forces to engage more closely with a local community

Written by Agio Pereira

Díli, December 2011

Abstract

Community based policing has become an important policing option for many developed and developing countries; countries where institutional frailty, particularly in the area of law enforcement sector, consider community policing as an important component of overall policing strategies. Why is community policing is important and how best to approach this policing strategy is still an ongoing debate in the realms of policy-makers as well as academic community and the police force itself. One reason is because crime prevention and crime eradication is a constant part of society and the root-cause of crime is researched but consensus is not an easy place to land. Since Adam Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations, Cesare Beccaria’s ‘Crime and Punishment’ and Colquhoun’s ‘A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis – Containing a detail of the various crimes and misdemeanors by which public and Private Property and Security are, at prefent (sic), injured and endangered and suggesting remedies for their prevention’, considered to be the first book ever comprehensively written on policing, still there is no answer to how communities should deal with crime. One reason is because the problem is not crime itself, but the way communities generate fear and respond to the perceived factors of fear under different circumstances of community’s existence, including the space, the politics, the level of social integration and inter-community relations within a state. In the meantime, ‘beat policing’ is increasingly adopted as the best approach to generate community confidence in the police force because it increases the perception that police officers are present within the community or, at least, readily accessible in case they are needed. Crime cannot be exterminated by the police, but together with the community, the element of fear can be mitigated so that healthy living can be the focus of living as a community. Increasing the cost of crime further contributed towards this end.

 Introduction

Time magazine’s essay ‘Peace Through Security’, by Tim Padgett, rightly argues that Central America’s crisis calls for better policing, not more military.[1] This call reflects concern for legitimacy as well as a reflection on whether the military can ever respond to situations of civil unrest and systemic criminality. Around the world, situation of crises, high criminal rate and systemic disorder, focusing on effective policing in the community has become the answer because the aim is to enhance police legitimacy and the trust of citizens on the institutions of law enforcement and, ultimately, on the state itself. But what is community policing? In short, community policing is a natural phenomenon derived from the survival instinct of the individuals as well as a collective need for survival. Police forces evolved from this basic instinct. Society, community, family and individual citizens are interdependent;[2] and since the division of labor[3] evolved within society, partly imposed by the concept of property,[4] the need for protection became increasingly institutionalized. It is about curbing greed in the society[5] so that predictability can be enhanced and harmonious society becomes viable and strengthened. Man also became ‘conjoined’[6] with citizen and the duties to the state. Community policing is also needed because ‘even if man were born in a condition to desire to enter society, it does not follow that he was born suitably equipped to enter society…distrust, suspicion, precaution and provision against fear are all characteristic of men who are afraid’.[7] The state and the citizen share mutual fear; helping each other to overcome it brings about the state’s prerogative of mutual benefits. Successful community policing can enhance restraints, which in the English of the seventeenth century, Colquhoun posits ‘as the means of preventing Crimes, are fuch (sic) as muft (sic)  produce this falutary (sic) effect, without hindering the privileges of innocence; fince (sic)  they apply to thofe (sic)  claffes (sic)  only, the nature of whole dealings, from being in many inftances (sic) both unlawful and immoral, immediately affect …the Country at large.’[8] Therefore, community policing is about overcoming fear in the community as well as the concern of the police forces about their inability to impose sufficient restraints on the citizens so that society can be free from fear. This essay highlights beat policing as an example of community based policing and then attempts to explain the factors influencing a Police Force to engage more closely with local communities.[9]

Police, crime and the local community: a symbiotic relationship

On Beat Policing and the Community

A report by the Queensland (Australia) Crime and Misconduct Commission evaluating beat policing in Queensland, asserts that ‘beat policing is expected to have an impact on crime, in part because officers embark on proactive, preventive strategies, and in part because officers provide a visible police presence in the community or shopping centre.’[10] The key findings pertaining to neighbourhood beats include reduction in overall crime rate as well as property crime rates and increase in the rate of reported crime.[11] However, on the perceptions of crime and personal safety, although ‘beat policing aims to build community partnerships and improve the relationship between police and the public’,[12] the report established that, generally, ‘beats do not necessarily make residents feel safer; nor do shopfronts necessarily make shoppers and retailers feel more safe’.[13] Hence, the report recommends that beat officers should be allowed to respond to more matters in their area and manage their workload more effectively,[14] remain focus and continually meet the needs of beat-area residents.[15] Nevertheless, neighborhood beats led to residents in higher perceived levels of crime and disorder to believe that these problems were improving,[16] allowing for the conclusion that ‘beat officers are responsive and effective in addressing crime and disorder in their neighborhoods’.[17] The need to regular evaluation and review of success and failure, as well as effectiveness[18] and relevance[19] were particularly identified as important for successful police beats. One factor favoring beat policing is the rationale related to the ‘utilitarian theory’.[20] It ‘assumes that criminals are rational and balance the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action’,[21] and that ‘when criminals are given the choice of illegal versus legal avenues of economic gain, they more often choose the latter when the costs of crime increase.’[22] It follows that the presence of beat policing can increase the costs of crime, making criminal acts less attractive.      

But what is a local community? - Nowadays, there are virtual communities such as the Facebook community, the twitters community and the Wikileak community. There are the real communities like the Retired Service League (RSL) or the war veterans’ community, the elderly community,[23] the gangs’[24] community and the more geographically emphasised ‘local community’.[25] What is important from community policing point of view is that there are ‘common ties and social interaction’[26] within a local residential area. Citing Lowry Nelson, Hillery points out that “in general, the term community[27] refers to a group of people inhabiting a limited area, who have a sense of belonging together and who through their organized relationships share and carry on activities in pursuit of their common interests.’[28] One challenge for community policing is how to profile the problems facing a particular local community. In the case of Australia, commonness and common interests may be clear in terms of duties towards the state, paying taxes and expecting the Government to deliver social programs reflecting value for money. At a micro level, however, kinship and common historical and ethnic background tend to play more important role in social cohesion. Blocks of buildings, houses and apartments may not necessarily provide opportunities to develop an effective beat policing strategy; residents may ‘supplemented police with the doorman’[29] and ‘protect themselves as individuals and not as a community’,[30] making ‘the battle against crime effectively lost’.[31] Hence, making police presence almost permanent in a local area, through beat policing, may reduce fear. What is uncertain is whether necessarily increases safety in the house where domestic violence,[32] may occur.

Community policing: strategic partnership and empowerment

The inability of the Police Force to impose sufficient restraints against misconducts[33] and crime led to the decision to bring members of the community to bear some degree of responsibility to overcome factors affecting fear, including unexpected acts of misconducts. Alcoholism, high-activity drugs areas or hot spots,[34] youth drug addiction,[35] theft, gangs ‘regular rendezvous’[36] and short run hedonism[37] and gangs’ graffiti,[38] are part of the factors inflicting fear in the community, namely because ‘predictions of intent and character’[39] can be totally unreliable. Individuals and families need an environment free from fear in order to focus on their development; children need not fear their own surrounding so they can focus on learning and growing with faith in making the most of what society has to offer. Hence, the local communities, including the children and youth in general are the most interested parties because solving the problems that impede them to live with peace of mind becomes a step of paramount importance. Strategic community policing is, therefore, also a community empowerment scheme. For this empowerment to be effective, however, local Police Force needs to adequate its own structure and resources to fulfill, both, the expectations of the community as well as those of the Police Force. Hence, the positive move to employ police aids to enhance effective communication between the Police and the members of a local community. Effective proficiency in the foreign but simultaneously local languages is one way to enhance communication between the interested parties – the Police and the members of local communities. In addition, effective Police intelligence gathering also helps to make the right decisions, as opposed to adopting approaches which are based on hear-say, thus hindering success. Above all, it is important to conceive of empowerment of local communities as not only meaning the need to genuinely listening to their concerns but also “making community members active participants in the process of problem solving’,[40] ‘creating a constructive partnership’[41] and ‘reinvigorating communities’.[42] The Police Force ought to be moved by these key factors when decision is made to move closer to local communities. To ensure success in crime reduction, police officers engaged in beat policing, for instance, as a form of community based policing, will need to be adequately trained in community relations and the challenges of youth in underprivileged areas of society.    

Critics of beat policing argue that a dilemma in crime reduction is that successful beat policing in reducing crime may cause ‘crime displacement’.[43] This can be true but not impossible to overcome because ‘crime is opportunistic’[44] and ‘protection is only as good as its coverage’.[45] Therefore, community policing can make a real difference to local communities in reducing fear because effective community based policing means policing is more integrated with the security problems and needs of local communities. The strategic importance and value-added effect of community policing are that beat patrol provides for a permanent visibility of police force, not only in residential areas but also where local communities and vulnerable groups perform educational and leisure activities. Such visibility is even more important in areas where the phenomenon of ‘broken windows’,[46] the downgrading of social order occurs. Effective Police-Community partnership can enhance the capacity to manage law and order by ‘impeding “small” (offences) slide by’,[47] thus nurturing the trust of the citizens on their Police Force.  If community policing does little to crime deterrence but instead it correlates with crime displacement,[48] one  value-added is that the Police Force can understand better some motives of crimes committed within a particular geographical area. Kelling and Coles rightly posit that, in small and homogenous neighborhoods and communities, ‘even the most seriously deranged individuals are known personally to those in the community: everyone knows how far they will go, so their behavior is predictable, even if defiant.’[49] Thus, listening to the community members’ own understanding of the magnitude, frequency and motives of these crimes enhances such understanding. Although crime displacement is a complex phenomenon to prove,[50] relieving community’s stress and not letting the community feel alone in coping with the effects of crime and misconducts, can enhance certainty and minimize ‘social disorganization’;[51] and the ‘inability of local communities to realize their common values or solving commonly experienced serious problems’ can also be overcome.[52] In return, the Police Force gains enhanced legitimacy and respect from their own community – the Police reason d’être. As the Police become more engaged with the local community, familiarity with community concerns about safety is developed, which brings about the responsibility to manage community expectations successfully. This means adopting a two-track approach; giving ‘priority to problems of more current and intense concern’ and balance this by addressing ‘less visible problems of equal magnitude and seriousness, lest the process deteriorate so that the police once again assuming a reactive stance.’[53]           

Conclusion

Community based policing is part of the strategy of making the Police Forces more pro-active in response to disturbances and crime within local communities, leading to a Police Force with enhanced legitimacy and a community empowered with problem-solving capacity. There are a number of factors which rightly influence the Police Force to work towards stronger and more strategic engagement with local communities. First, crime cannot be eradicated by the Police Force because the institution is not devised to be crime exterminator. Nevertheless, this is precisely the expectation of the community; that the Police keep the communities safe from crime. Secondly, the Police Force has the responsibility to protect the citizens and the community in general. Therefore, nurturing trust between the Police and the community it exists to serve and to belong is sacrosanct. Third, the Police Force may not be prepared to be crime exterminator but dealing with crimes in ways that makes the community feel safer is a responsibility the Police cannot escape from. Therefore, find the best possible ways is a must. The best ways must include key policing strategies. First, promoting active Police-community interaction to increase the costs of crime; in a gain-pain scenario, the perpetrators rationally make decisions bearing in mind the cost of crime and if the cost unacceptably higher, crime be reduced. Secondly, there is the need to listen and to reinvigorate the community. The fighting spirit, not the surrendering spirit, needs to be upheld within the community so the potential perpetrators do not feel like fish in the ocean but simply fish in a tiny lake, which also requires nurturing an ongoing constructive police-community partnership. The expected outcome, after all, is to create an environment where local communities can be free from fear. As Miller contends, ‘it matters little how economically sound, aesthetically appealing, administratively efficient, or environmentally unobtrusive an area is if the people who live there live in fear. Under such conditions the area will decline.’[54] To stop local communities decline into a disturbance–ridden environment is a noble Police goal, but achieving such a goal requires effective partnership between local communities and their Police Forces. Hence, community based policing!

Reference

Barnes, G, ‘Defining and Optimizing Displacement’, in Crime and Place, J Eck & D Weisbury (eds.), Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 4, pp.95 – 113, Criminal Justice Press, Willow Tree Press, 1995, p.104

Beccaria, C, ‘On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings’, R Bellamy (ed.) & R Davies (trans.), Cambridge university Press, 2003

Bureau of Justice Assistance, ‘Understanding Community Policing – A Framework for Action’, Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance Response Center, Washington DC, August 1994

Bursik, R, ‘Social Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency’, Criminology, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp.519-551

Cohen, A, Delinquent Boys – The Culture of the Gang’, Free Press, Illinois, USA, 1955

Colquhoun, P, ‘A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis – Containing a detail of the various crimes and misdemeanors by which public and Private Property and Security are, at prefent (sic), injured and endangered and suggesting remedies for their prevention’, H. Fry, Finsbury – Place, London, UK, 1797

De Becker, The Gift of Fear- and other survival signals that protect us from violence’, Dell Publishing, New York, USA, 1997

Durkheim, E, ‘The Division of Labor’, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, USA, 1947

Eck, J, & Weisburd, D, Crime and Place, Criminal Justice Press, New York, USA, 1995

Edgar, D, Earle, L, & Fopp, R, ‘What is Australian Society?’, Introduction to Australian Society, 2^nd Ed., Prentice Hall, Melbourne, pp.1-15,1993

Goldstein, H, Problem-Oriented Policing, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, USA, 1990

Hillery, G, ‘Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement”, Rural Sociology, 20, 2:111-123, 1995, p.118

Hobbs, T, Man and Citizen, Gert, B (ed.), Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, USA, 1991

Hobbs, T, ‘On the citizen’, R Tuck & M Silverthorne (eds.), Cambridge University Press, UK, 2005

Jeffery, C, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, SAGE Publications, Inc., California, USA

Kelling, G, & Coles, C, Fixing Broken Windows- Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities’, Touchstone, New York, NY, USA,1996

Levine, M, Broken Windows, Broken Business- How the Smallest Remedies Reap the Biggest Rewards’, Warner Business Books, New York, NY, USA, 2005

Marvel, T & Moody, C, ‘Specification Problems, Police Levels and Crime Rates’, Criminology, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp.609 – 646

Mazerolle, P, Adams, K, Budz, D, Cockerill, C, & Vance, M, On the Beat – An Evaluation of beat policing in Queensland’, Crime and Misconduct Commission Research Report, Brisbane, Australia, 2003

Miller, E, ‘Crime’s Threat to Land Value and Neighborhood Vitality, in P Brantingham & P Brantingham (eds.), Environmental Criminology, Waveland Press, Inc., Illinois, USA, 1981

Moore, J, Homeboys – Gangs, Drugs, and Prison in the Barrios of Los Angeles, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, USA, 1978

Newman, O, Defensible Space – Crime Prevention Through Urban Design, The Macmillan Company, New York, NY, USA, 1972

Newsquest Media Group, ‘Police take waiting duties at elderly dinner in Welwyn Garden City’, St Albans Review St. Albans, SO January 2011, accessed 21 January 2011, www.stalbansreview.co.uk 

Padgett, T, ‘Peace Through Security – Central America’s crime crisis calls for better policing, not more military’, Time, October 2011

Smith, A, ‘The Wealth of Nations’, Bantam Classic, New York, USA, 2003

The Administrator, ‘Launch of Gang Resistance Education Training (GREAT) Program, Belize’ 20 January, 2011, accessed 21 January 2011, www.guaridan.bz/all-news/59-other-news/2757-launch-of-gangs-resistance-education...

Weisburd, D, & Green, L, ‘Policing Drug Hot spots: The Jersey City Drug Market Analysis Experiment’, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp.711 – 735

---

[1] T Padgett, ‘Peace Through Security – Central America’s crime crisis calls for better policing, not more military’, Time, October 2011, p.54.

[2] D Edgar, L Earle & R Fopp, ‘What is Australian Society?’, Introduction to Australian Society, 2^nd Ed., Prentice Hall, Melbourne, pp.1-15,1993

[3] E Durkheim, ‘The Division of Labor’, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, USA, 1947

[4] A Smith, ‘The Wealth of Nations’, Bantam Classic, New York, USA, 2003

[5] C Beccaria, ‘On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings’, R Bellamy (ed.) & R Davies (trans.), Cambridge university Press, 2003

[6] T Hobbs, ‘Man and Citizen’, B Gert (ed.), Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, USA, 1991, p.35

[7] T Hobbs, ‘On the citizen’, R Tuck & M Silverthorne (eds.), Cambridge university Press, UK, 2005, p.25

[8] P Colquhoun, ‘A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis – Containing a detail of the various crimes and misdemeanors by which public and Private Property and Security are, at prefent (sic), injured and endangered and suggesting remedies for their prevention’, H. Fry, Finsbury – Place, London, UK, 1797, pp. xii-xiv

[9] Detailed reference is provided as much as possible in view that those who access this short essay may wish to pursue more in-depth research on the same topic

[10] P Mazerolle, K Adams, D Budz, C Cockerill & M Vance, On the Beat – An Evaluation of beat policing in Queensland’, Crime and Misconduct Commission Research Report, Brisbane, Australia, 2003, p.23

[11] P Mazerolle et. al, p.38

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid, p.39

[14] Ibid, p.88

[15] Ibid

[16] Ibid, p.45

[17] Ibid

[18] Herman Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, USA,1990, p.36

[19] Ibid

[20] Thomas Marvel & Carlisle Moody, ‘Specification Problems, Police Levels and Crime Rates’, Criminology, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp.609 – 646, p.609

[21] Ibid

[22] Ibid

[23] Newsquest Media Group, ‘Police take waiting duties at elderly dinner in Welwyn Garden City’, St Albans Review St. Albans, SO January 2011, accessed 21 January 2011, www.stalbansreview.co.uk 

[24] The Administrator, ‘Launch of Gang Resistance Education Training (GREAT) Program, Belize’ 20 January, 2011, accessed 21 January 2011, www.guaridan.bz/all-news/59-other-news/2757-launch-of-gangs-resistance-education...

[25] P Mazerolle et. al, op.cit.

[26] George Hillery, ‘Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement”, Rural Sociology, 20, 2:111-123, 1995, p.118

[27] Emphasis in the original

[28] Ibid, p.117

[29] Oscar Newman, Defensible Space – Crime Prevention Through Urban Design, The Macmillan Company, New York, NY, USA, 1972,  p.3

[30] Ibid

[31] Ibid

[32] H Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing,1990, p.91

[33] P Colquhoun, 1797, op.cit, p.xii

[34] David Weisburd & Lorraine Green, ‘Policing Drug Hot spots: The Jersey City Drug Market Analysis Experiment’, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp.711 – 735, pp. 713-4

[35]Joan Moore, Homeboys – Gangs, Drugs, and Prison in the Barrios of Los Angeles, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, USA, 1978

[36] A Cohen, Delinquent Boys – The Culture of the Gang’, Free Press, Illinois, USA, 1955, p.30

[37] Ibid

[38]J Moore, 1978, p.37

[39] G de Becker, The Gift of Fear- and other survival signals that protect us from violence’, Dell Publishing, New York, USA,1997, p.89

[40] Bureau of Justice Assistance, ‘Understanding Community Policing – A Framework for Action’, Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance Response Center, Washington DC, August 1994, p.vii

[41] Ibid

[42] Ibid

[43] Geoffrey Barnes, ‘Defining and Optimizing Displacement’, in Crime and Place, J Eck & D Weisbury (eds.), Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 4, pp.95 – 113, Criminal Justice Press, Willow Tree Press, 1995, p.104

[44] C. Ray Jeffery, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, SAGE Publications, Inc., California, USA, p.229

[45] Ibid, p.228

[46] Michael Levine, Broken Windows, Broken Business- How the Smallest Remedies Reap the Biggest Rewards’, Warner Business Books, New York, NY, USA, 2005, p.1

[47] Ibid

[48] John Eck & David Weisburd, Crime and Place, Criminal Justice Press, New York, USA, 1995, pp.102-3

[49] George Kelling & Catherine Coles, Fixing Broken Windows- Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities’, Touchstone, New York, NY, USA,1996, p.15

[50] Ibid

[51] Robert Bursik, ‘Social Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency’, Criminology, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp.519-551

[52] Ibid, p.521

[53] H Goldstein, ‘Problem-Oriented Policing’,  p.79

[54] Eldon Miller, ‘Crime’s Threat to Land Value and Neighborhood Vitality, in P Brantingham & P Brantingham (eds.), Environmental Criminology, Waveland Press, Inc., Illinois, USA, 1981, p.117

Theories of Political Violence and Terrorism

By: Agio Pereira

Topic

Agio Pereira


“Why does non-state political violence occur and under what circumstances might it be justified."


Abstract

Wars and terror have occurred time and again; and much of the violence is justified as 'for the sake of common good'. The interest of the majority is at stake, so the perpetrators may argue. Within the confinement of modern states, political violence may be justified in the spectrum of 'for the sake of common good'. The Constitution and laws both justify and limit the use of political violence. However, as states become dysfunctional because of its inability to deliver services and protection to its citizens and, instead, the state becomes a constant barrier for the fulfilment of the hierarchy of needs of its citizens, the ultimate power of the state to legally use violence is challenged, both, by its citizens as well as by the international community, including the United Nations. The responsibility to protect or R2P may be called upon, as we have now seen, for the first time, in the case of Libya; so the citizens can, under certain circumstances, acquire decisive support to destroy their government and the prevailing political regime. In this situation the social contract becomes null and void. A new social contract is needed in order to sustain governance and make it possible for the state to sustain and exercise its rightful sovereignty. The road to peace, however, is never easy. Regimes and long established states, often disregard the power of public opinion - national and international. With a planet of more than seven billion people, with many so well connected through rapid and universal communications, including the widespread availability of means of violence,  it becomes extremely difficult for regimes to survive against the will of their peoples. Those acting on behalf of states and come face-to-face with those they identified and fight against in the spirit of 'war on terror' may realise, as many Americans did in Iraq, that these 'are people like us', with the same goal of living in peace, freedom and free from fear. They fear their 'faraway enemy' as well as their 'nearby enemy'. In the end, crossing the same path in life can produce only two outcomes: either you become friends or enemies. The choice is simple. Coexistence and making government viable are critical ingredients for any solution because government, as Kenneth Waltz posits in his seminal work "Man, the State and War", is ultimately 'a precondition of society'.

Keywords: non-state actors, terrorism, the state, government, social contract, war on terror, violence, R2P, revolution, protests, social justice.

Introduction

If it is true that humans are ‘born to be good’[1] then the ‘hierarchy of needs’[2] is what can derail the need to produce ‘high jen’[3] which is, in turn, is replaced by violence. Hence, the occurrence of non-state political violence is common feature; and since state emerged as an entity, groups have resorted to violence to achieve political goals. Some forms of violence are seen as terrorism[4] or simply acts espoused by criminals. Liberation movements striving for political independence are seen as using justified violence, at least, under international law.[5] In the sixties, during the era of empires and colonialism, groups of people, from Africa, Asia and South America, organised into liberation movements to end European Empires.[6] One by one, empires crumbled and new nation-states emerged.[7] But these movements were legally accepted under the United Nations’ principle of inalienable right of peoples to self-determination. During WWII, countries like China fought to expel Japan and end its occupation; Indonesia also fought to expel its colonial power, the Netherlands, and gained ‘sovereign power’.[8] More recently, East Timor[9] also fought to end almost a quarter of a century of Indonesian occupation to become a sovereign state. Since 2001, after the United States’ declaration of the ‘War on Terror’[10] and the ‘Executive Order 13224’[11] to ‘block the assets of any foreign individuals or entities engaging in or otherwise supporting terrorism’,[12] terrorism and counterinsurgency occupy much of the concerns pertaining to global security. The notion of ‘asymmetric warfare’,[13] although far from new, becomes one of expert dilemmas; and strong states, including the only current superpower, the United States of America, struggle to come to terms with the resilience of non-state actors of violence. Counterinsurgency becomes the war to overcome, effectively challenging conventional security philosophies based on military strategies,[14] with the prospect of insurgencies winning, by forcing the enemy to reach its ‘breaking point’.[15] To respond to non-state political violence, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, there is a need to contemplate avenues beyond military force, respond to cultural, religious and tribal perspectives of politics and ensure that development overcomes the drawbacks of military actions.[16]  Political violence becomes enmeshed with religion, social injustice, corruption and unemployment. Solutions are put forward, books are written, but the problem remains one of the most intricate challenges of the post Cold War era. This short essay will not present an exhaustive spectrum of the problem, but will attempt to look into why non-state political violence occurs and under what circumstances might it be justified.

State’s monopoly of force and genesis of non-state political violence

Concepts, justification and limitation

A synthesis form what Grimm wrote in his paper ‘The State Monopoly of Force’, tells us much about the genesis, justification and limitations of this important concept. State’s monopoly on the use of force reflects public law and the need to regulate ‘the relationship between the state and individuals as well as private associations’[17] but this requires legitimacy[18] drawn from the support of the people. Legal State authority (gewalt), sovereign power and public authority provide the State with the right to exercise control over others (protestas).  The entitlement to use force was always intrinsic in the protection of common interests, because ‘everyone was entitled to see to their rights, if needed be by force of arms’.  Monopoly evolved from the principle of the right of the individual to protect his/her property, such as ownership of the land (patria protestas).

Justification, on the other hand, requires ‘social contract’, legal frameworks and ‘organized mechanism to ensure compliance with the law’.  Social contract is based on ‘fair exchange’[19] whereby ‘sensible people would be prepared to give up their natural freedom and right to enforce their own rights, and submit to the rule of the state’.[20] Justification evolved into a Constitution - the legal foundation of public authority and the State’s monopoly on the use of force for the sake of common weal. However, limitations require a codified entitlement and this derives from collective constitutional decisions.[21]

Beyond boundaries, State sovereignty becomes another limitation. The State may impose its legally established rules within its own territory, but not beyond. This is regulated by ‘the general rules of public international law’.[22] States may go to war to protect its sovereignty, but UN Charter provides for member states to refrain from violating the sovereignty of another.[23] Nevertheless, globalisation increasingly underestimates national laws and institutions, including the ‘supranational law’ of the EU. The World Trade Organisation, ‘voluntary commitment’ and evolving ‘norms of transnationals commercial law’[24] keep this power of globalisation in check. 

Non-state violence: when is it political?

The state is a juridical entity which exists to provide protection and security to all those living within its national territory and legal jurisdiction. In some circumstances, this duty to protect may be exercised beyond its territorial boundaries, acting alone or with other states. Within its national boundaries, the state enacts laws to ensure prevalence of the accepted norms. The expectations are enshrined in the Constitution, the social contract, which the state’s existence is based upon. The state thus acquire its legal foundation to retain exclusive ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of force,’[25] when justified under the principle of common weal, to suppress violence perpetrated by its own citizens, using ‘the severest means at its disposal – that of criminal law’,[26] if necessary. To ensure systematic result, the state establishes the criminal justice system which encompasses the police, the courts and the prisons. These institutions act in syntony to ensure that those who are caught acting against the rule of law shall be punished. Punishment is expected to also act as deterrence for others to behave according to the accepted norms; and to condemn and control those acting in a deviant manner, outside the boundaries of what society has determined as legal.

However, as democratisation evolves the phenomenon of violence within the states and beyond boundaries is closely being monitored and studied. As violence becomes widespread and non-state actors effectively challenge the exclusive monopoly of the state in the use of violence, also ‘in the interest of the public weal’,[27] the attempt to discriminate what is political violence and what is merely non-political violence becomes blurred. Determining ‘what constitutes violence is a high-risk undertaking’ because the liberal democratic world is now ‘in an age when moral, sexual, educational, and legal standards of values are being abandoned, or at least widely relaxed’,[28] thus making it easier for definitions to commit ‘the overstepping of boundaries’[29] mistake.

Nevertheless, structural problems enshrined in the nature of the state may directly impact on the course of violence – at individual and group levels. John Burton sees historical root of violence in ‘the we-they, interest-oriented power relationships’,[30] even ‘in the most democratic and economically developed of countries’.[31] Peter Imbusch adds that violence ‘is omnipresent, a largely contingent phenomenon, and its ubiquity is independent of a particular cultural area. We encounter violence everywhere, in matters large and small, at national and international level’.[32] Therefore, political violence is not only part of living, but has always been there, present in human interactions, in various forms and circumstances.  Eve more so perhaps, when humans evolved to constitutes communities and societies where close interaction creates opportunities for both, peace and conflict.  

Politics and political, changing societies and thinking           

           

The gap between the rich and the poor is increasing. This phenomenon occurs everywhere, even in healthy and powerful economies; and liberal democracies. Social equity is not the common feature of democracy, albeit it constitutes a constant ideal and morally bound political goal to be pursued.[33] In addition, equitable distribution of wealth of a state can mitigate violence which undermines the legitimacy of democratic institutions and those in power. To ascertain why violence occurs within the confinement of a state, whereby citizens defy the legal structures of suppression of violence, one may have to adopt the perspective that the nation and the state are not necessarily in tune with each other. In his analysis of the illusory community, pertaining to the Nation, Ross Poole contends that ‘the social space created by the market’,[34] the family, the country and the state,[35] are part of or an extension of individual self-fulfilment.[36] It is possible that when the person is not capable of ‘accommodating the requirements of societies’,[37] alienation increases and the person may resort to violence against the barriers perceived as making life unnecessarily very difficult. This reflects what Burton also contends, that ‘people as individuals and as members of communities do not necessarily behave as is expected of good citizens in divided[38] societies, not because of a lack of social consciousness, but through an inherent inability to accept alienation,[39] which results from a genetic need for social integration’.

However, ‘adequate restraints on the human passion’[40] are needed ‘to insure that peace is likewise maintained’. Maintaining peace is forever a huge challenge for all states, big and small. Peace, not in the sense of heavenly order, but in terms of harmonious environment where all can strive for what they can to satisfy the hierarchy of needs. As resources are most often than not insufficient to provide for all to effectively work toward satisfying all the needs, sacrifice is needed. As sacrifice becomes more and more of a system of normality rather than exceptional situation, tension heightened and conflicts arise. Mitigating this process is a duty of the state, but the monopoly of the legal use of force can never be the solution.    

Justification of political violence

It is reasonable to assert that ‘emerging conditions, especially population increases, rapid and universal communications and the widespread availability of means of violence, are making it increasingly difficult for authorities to impose traditional institutional norms that frustrate human aspirations’.[41] Nevertheless, justification of non-state political violence lies on the imprisonment of human aspirations beyond the range of tolerance within which such aspirations can be contained. In the current global security environment and, particularly since the end of the Cold War, non-state actors of political violence constitute high risk and threats the states face. Therefore, formulating appropriate response is a constant need the state cannot ignore. The security environment is now affected by multipolarity of forces and interests and, consequently, the sates are now more flexible in deciding who should be their strategic ally. This makes asymmetric warfare a more complex phenomenon to counter, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq testify. The current wave of ‘revolutions’ against governments in the Middle East, for example, bring about the scenario of citizens of the state challenging the legitimacy of their tyrants’ decades-old regimes which nurtured injustice in terms of poverty,[42] corruption and unemployment. These regimes also succeeded in maintaining control on power because the apparatus established by the dictatorship to curb dissidents became effective in curbing the democratic demands and aspirations of their own citizens.

Violence, thus, tend to be associated with injustice in terms of systematic breach of fairness. Such an injustice, seen and encapsulated into the realms of political struggle, strike the cord of political violence, as a legitimate mean to provoke change for the better, to replace injustice for the sake of common weal. And violence in the form of revolution, not conventional war, means politics is ‘the principal instrument’,[43] not the traditional military way. Even in Libya, where Muammar al-Qaddafi believed he has created ‘the most democratic country in the world, a land where, he thinks, Rousseau’s “General Will” has been given genuine expression’,[44] its people refuse to continue to provide legitimacy and adopts non-state political violence to end his regime and provoke his death. Libyan elite refused to concede power easily and made use of the state’s monopoly of force to dictate their way,[45] but, ultimately, the will of the people, as history has shown time and again, prevailed. Libya and the death of al-Qaddafi also mark the first time the United Nations proclaimed ‘responsibility to help’ or R2P was put into practice. For some, this foreign military intervention was the right thing to do. For others, the legal grounds to justify foreign intervention are shaky. It is, therefore, certain, that the justification for military intervention under the guise of R2P will continue to be a heated debate in the international realms. The developments in Syria can be a good litmus test. If the election in Egypt proves to be unsatisfied and unfair to the needs of the protesters, the ‘unfinished revolution’ in Egypt may evolve towards an environment where non-state actors decide to organise differently to eliminate the foundation of the old regime. Adopting more sustained violent tactics may be an option. The question will be whether the international community should intervene, as in Libya, through military means to protect the people.   

Revolutions, protests by trade unions and intense public campaigns, national liberation movements and their guerrilla armies, can all be part of acceptable violence, for being violent forces striving for common weal, having justice as the overall goal. Protests against the structural (dis) functionality of the state can easily ‘move in the direction of threat and violence when no progress is made’.[46] When this lack of progress becomes serious political causes, such as the cases of liberation movements and impromptu public outrage against their government, the consciousness of fighting for the nationalism and identity is enhanced. Under such circumstances, ‘widespread violence and terrorism’[47] can replace peaceful protests. And under such a situation, the entire scenario of security reaches a new level of threat, one that brings about deaths and destruction and may become a long-term challenge for the power of the state. As for terrorism, in the context of non-state political violence, the genetic need for social integration is, indeed, an important underlying cause. As Burton posits:     

The perception we have of ‘terrorists’ is that of persons who are abnormal and disturbed and who need to be removed from society. Yet in fact they have, typically, more than average intelligence, but frequently have been deprived of educational and career opportunities. The role their activities provide gives them an identity, and the more active they are, the more risks they take, the greater respect they acquire.[48]

Quoting Richard Rubenstein, Burton further observes that ‘One need have very little sympathy for terrorists to insist that they are neither brutes nor devils, but people in many ways like us’.[49] It is, therefore, possible to argue that al Qaeda’s Jihadism as being a case of reconnecting ‘isolated individuals’[50] who ‘rediscovered their ‘religious past’,[51] strengthening their sense of identity and group bonding, as strong as ‘a love affair’ which arises ‘from a network of religious revival, but if the group is exposed to and accepts a militant philosophy, it can become militarised.’[52] The militant jihad promotes violence against, both, its ‘’faraway enemy’[53], which is the United States of America, and its ‘nearby enemy’[54] - the group of ‘corrupt rulers’[55] in the Arabic world, particularly in the Middle East. In addition, converted members of al Qaeda, after having ‘swore bayah  - an individual oath of loyalty’,[56] become trusted and entrusted with specific missions against their enemies, thus becoming lethal non-state actors of political violence.

Conclusion

Why non-state violence occurs and under what circumstances can it be justified? First, the state and its rules may not always be ‘user-friendly’. When citizens are alienated because the rules are not helping them meet their hierarchy of needs and the much-needed social integration as dictated by human nature, political violence can become a mean to overcome alienation generated by the weakness of state system. Common weal must, therefore, be always scrutinised, because political violence can mirror two major types of weaknesses: a) failure of the social contract which forms the basis for legitimacy of the state and b) failure to provide appropriate response and real progress to demands pertaining for social justice. Second, history teaches us the lesson that crusaders can be activated as ‘a military response to…terrorist aggression’[57] for the very important needs of identity, religion and territory. Contemporary terrorism can also be the consequence of identity crisis, whereby people feels disenfranchised by the power of the state and adopts political violence to reaffirm identity and worthiness. Hence, under circumstances where non-state actors adopt political violence or direct action, the justification is based on the feelings of those oppressed. Third, since limitation shall be in making the government viable and sensitive to people’s cry for freedom because government is ‘a pre-condition of society’,[58] a real solution must conform to the norms of political compromise, not the use of excessive force by the state to curb violence for violence sake. The same applies to liberation movements striving for national identity and independence, including using political violence which international law constitutes the basis for its justification. The case of the Taliban in Afghanistan, however, comes with enormous complexities;[59] a military occupation in response to terrorism, but concurrent with attempts to meet real development needs and the creation of a viable secular statehood. The violence from both sides of the fence is political, although the violent actions of non-state actor Taliban is said to be terrorism that of the U.S. and allies are said to be counterinsurgency.[60] In the case of Libya dictator against his own people, the attempt to hang on to power was not justified because the regime has lost its legitimacy. Fourth, on global security, one needs not to forget that non-state actors of political violence may not necessarily be responsible for global insecurity.[61] On the contrary, no matter how hard it is to visualise through the lens of legal power, history tells us that they may be ‘perfect soldiers’ to fix it, by getting rid of the causes of insecurity as, again, Libyans have done successfully. Fifth and last, once all said and done, it is really up to those who feel victimised by the perceived ‘best laws’[62]  of their country to demonstrate willingness to strike back to overcome victimisation, including  resorting to violent political action if necessary. Justification thus correlates with the magnitude of victimisation the non-state actors of political violence believe they have been unbearably and, perhaps, criminally, subjected to.        

Reference

Adams, J, The Financing of Terror, Simon & Schuster, New York, USA, 1986

Burton, J, Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence, Crime and their Prevention, Manchester University Press, Manchester, USA, 1997

Cashman, G, What Causes War?, Lexington Books, Maryland, USA, 1993

Chesterman, S, Ignatieff, M & Thakur, R, ‘Conclusion: The Future of state-building’, pp.359 -387, in Making States Work – state failure and the crisis of governance, in Chesterman, S, Ignatieff, M & Thakur, R (eds.),United Nations university Press, New York, USA, 2005

Collier, P, The Plundered Planet, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2010

Collier, P, The Bottom Billion, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2008

Cooper, R, The Breaking of Nations – Order and Chaos in the Twentieth-First Century, Atlantic Books, London, UK, 2004

Galula, D, Counterinsurgency Warfare – Theory and Practice, Praeger Security International, USA, 2006

Green, P & Ward, T, State Crime – Governments, Violence and Corruption, Pluto Press, London, UK, 2004

Grimm, D, ‘The State Monopoly of  Force’, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer & John Hagan (eds.), International Handbook of Violence Research, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003

Heitmeyer, W & Hagan, J, ‘Violence: The Difficulties of a Systematic International Review’, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer & John Hagan (eds.), International Handbook of Violence Research, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003

Hobbs, T, On the Citizen, Edited and Translated by Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne, Cambridge University Press, 1998

Imbusch, P, ‘The Concept of Violence’, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer & John Hagan (eds.), International Handbook of Violence Research, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003

Judd, D, Questioning Authority – Political Resistance and the Ethic of Natural Science, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, USA, 2009

Keltner, D, Born to be Good – The Science of a Meaningful Life, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, USA, 2009

Kepel, G, The War for Muslim Minds- Islam and the West, The Belknap Press of Harvard university Press, Massachusetts, USA,2004

Kilcullen, D, Counterinsurgency, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2010

McChrystal, S, ‘Special Address’, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, UK, 1 October 2009

Moghaddam, F, Global Insecurity, Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, California, USA, 2010

Poole, R, ‘Morality and Modernity’, Routledge, 1900, London, pp.90-109, in George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Re-Shaping the Memory of the World Wars, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990,  p.100 -103 (PIC810 Unit Reader, SP1/2011, p.32-3)

Rashid, A, Taliban- Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 2^nd Ed., Yale University Press, USA, 2010

Record, J, Beating Goliath - Why Insurgencies Win, Potomac Books, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, 2009

Roshandel, J & Chadha, S, Jihad and International Security, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, USA

Sageman, M, Leaderless Jihad  Terror Networks in the Twentieth-First Century, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, USA, 2008

Stark, R, God’s Battalions – The Case for the Crusaders, Harper One, New York, USA, 2009

Suskind, R, The One Percent Doctrine, Simon & Schuster, NY, USA, 2006

Ucko, D, The New Counterinsurgency Era – Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., USA, 2009

Vattel, E, The Law of Nations, edited by B Kapossy & R Whatmore, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, USA, 2008

Waltz, K, Man, the State and War- a theoretical analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, USA, 2001

Watson, P & Barber, B, The Struggle for Democracy, W. H. Allen & Co Plc, Canada, 1988

White, J, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 6^th Ed., Wadsworth Cengage Learning, California, USA, 2009

---

[1] D Keltner, Born to be Good – The Science of a Meaningful Life, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, USA, 2009

[2] G Cashman, What Causes War?, Lexington Books, Maryland, USA, 1993, pp.38-9

[3] Ibid, p.6, emphasis in the original

[4] J Adams, The Financing of Terror, Simon & Schuster, New York, USA, 1986

[5] As in the case of East Timor (Timor-Leste), which after 24 years of war of liberation, gained independence under the protection of the United Nations and International Law

[6] R Cooper, The Breaking of Nations – Order and Chaos in the Twentieth-First Century, Atlantic Books, London, UK, 2004

[7] Ibid

[8] T Hobbs, On the Citizen, Edited and Translated by Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.89

[9] Official name Timor-Leste, in Portuguese

[10] R Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine, Simon & Schuster, NY, USA, 2006

[11] J Roshandel & S Chadha, Jihad and International Security, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, USA,   p.159

[12] Ibid

[13] R Thornton, Asymmetric Warfare, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2007

[14] D Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2010

[15] J Record, Beating Goliath - Why Insurgencies Win, Potomac Books, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, 2009,   p.67

[16] S McChrystal, ‘Special Address’, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, UK, 1 October 2009,

[17] D Grimm, ‘The State Monopoly of Force’, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer & John Hagan (eds), International Handbook of Violence Research, Dordrecht, Kluer Academic Publishers, 2003, p.53

[18] Ibid, p.54

[19] Ibid, p.55

[20] Ibid

[21] Ibid

[22] Ibid, p.56

[23] Ibid, pp.57-80

[24] Ibid, p.58

[25] S Chesterman, M Ignatieff & R Thakur, ‘Conclusion: The Future of state-building’, pp.359 -387, in Making States Work – state failure and the crisis of governance, in S Chesterman, M Ignatieff & R Thakur (eds.),United Nations university Press, New York, USA, 2005,  p.383

[26]D Grimm, ‘The State Monopoly of  Force’, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer & John Hagan (eds.), International Handbook of Violence Research, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003,  p.1044 (PIC810 Unit Reader, SP1/2011, p.54)

[27] Ibid

[28] Ibid

[29] W Heitmeyer & J Hagan, ‘Violence: The Difficulties of a Systematic International Review’, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer & John Hagan (eds.), International Handbook of Violence Research, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003,  p.4 (PIC810 Unit Reader, SP1/2011, )

[30] J Burton, Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence, Crime and their Prevention, Manchester University Press, Manchester, USA, 1997,  p.22

[31] Ibid

[32] P Imbusch, ‘The Concept of Violence’, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer & John Hagan (eds.), International Handbook of Violence Research, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003,  p.4 (PIC810 Unit Reader, SP1/2011)

[33] P Collier, The Plundered Planet, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2010

[34] R Poole, ‘’, p.100 -103 (PIC810 Unit Reader, SP1/2011, p.32-3)

[35] Ibid, p.100

[36] Ibid, p.101

[37] J Burton, 1997,  p.18

[38] Emphasis added

[39] Emphasis added

[40] D Judd, Questioning Authority – Political Resistance and the Ethic of Natural Science, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, USA, 2009, p.52

[41] J Burton, 1997,  p.26 (Unit Reader, 2011, p.6)

[42] P Collier, The Bottom Billion, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2008

[43] D Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare – Theory and Practice, Praeger Security International, USA, 2006, p.5

[44] P Watson & B Barber, The Struggle for Democracy, W. H. Allen & Co Plc, Canada, 1988,  p.75

[45] P Green & T Ward, State Crime – Governments, Violence and Corruption, Pluto Press, London, UK,  2004   

[46] J Burton, 1997,  p.27 (PIC810 Unit Reader, SP1/2011, p6)

[47] Ibid

[48] Ibid, p.27 (Unit Reader, p.6)

[49] Ibid

[50] J White, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 6^th Ed., Wadsworth Cengage Learning, California, USA, 2009, p.50

[51] Ibid

[52] Ibid

[53] G Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds- Islam and the West, The Belknap Press of Harvard university Press, Massachusetts, USA,2004, p.1

[54] Ibid

[55] Ibid

[56] M Sageman, Leaderless Jihad  Terror Networks in the Twentieth-First Century, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, USA, 2008,  p.29

[57] R Stark, God’s Battalions – The Case for the Crusaders, Harper One, New York, USA, 2009, cover

[58] K Waltz, Man, the State and War- a theoretical analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, USA, 2001, p.227

[59] A Rashid, Taliban- Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia,  2^nd Ed., Yale University Press, USA, 2010

[60] D Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era – Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., USA, 2009

[61] F Moghaddam, Global Insecurity, Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, California, USA, 2010

[62] E Vattel, The Law of Nations, edited by B Kapossy & R Whatmore, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, USA, 2008, pp. 193-5