UNMIT MISSION: DEVELOPMENT OR DESTRUCTION?

By: Julio Tomas Pinto

Secretary of State for Defence

Once again, UNMIT and its agencies’ attitude (UNDP UNCDF, UNEST and DGSU) have brought the Timorese to question United Nation’s mission in Timor-Leste. Through their actions we can also ask is UNMIT’s mission to develop or destroy? However before we can further discuss this we first need to clarify their mandate, UNMIT’s mandate in Timor-Leste, clearly is to support the state of Timor-Leste. Support means to provide technical assistance to the state in some of the areas which have been defined. For example to PNTL, UNMIT has provided support in five areas: operations, training, human resources as well as administration. In the defense sector they are providing only technical assistance, such as assessment assesoria as well as establishing a temporary building for the National Defense Institute. However if we properly analyse UNMIT’s attitude as well as their actions in Timor-Leste, we can see that sometimes their actions and words are not one and the same.

In 2009, I wrote an article entitled, (Reforming the Security Sector: Facing Challenges, Achieving Progress in Timor-Leste) to bring to UNMIT’s attention that their actions and words were not one and the same. You cannot say one thing up front and then behind the scenes do another creating a bad image for the state of Timor-Leste and appearing as though you know everything. The article “Reforming the Security Sector: Facing Challenges, Achieving Progress in Timor-Leste (2009)” was published in all the newspapers in Timor-Leste, and was met with a strong reaction from UNMIT. Sometimes we need an intervention to awaken UNMIT from their slumber, otherwise they will be running like blind cows. Mr. Ian Martin also reacted to this article. At a recent meeting in Timor-Leste between me and the SED team, Timor-Leste’s good friend Mr. Ian Martin in 2009 also gave his reaction to this article. In this article I said Timor-Leste knows democracy, knows human rights as well as the dignity of its people. That is why there cannot be a person, or an organisation as well as another nation to force the teachings or guide the implementation of human rights and democracy onto the people of Timor-Leste. The people together with Timor-Leste’s leadership know what Timor-Leste needs to do, and it’s not what other people want to have done in this beloved country. That is why we need to hold firm to the principle “to do what we (Timor Leste) need to do, rather than what others want”, so as to prevent the manipulative doctrine, which others have brought and tried to force Timor-Leste to implement. The implementation of human rights and democracy which is internationally enforced throughout the international community has to come from the people and Timor-Leste’s leaderships’ conscience according to the constitution and reinforced by the law.

The last case is the information which the newspaper Tempo Semanal published regarding UNMIT’s attack on the Head of Government (15/5/2011). On the 24th of January 2011, a member of UNMIT made a PowerPoint presentation with the topic FOR SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN TIMOR-LESTE. Contibutions to this presentation came from UN agenicies such as UNDP, UNCDF, UNEST & DGSU, because this document said “This presentation was based on contribution from UNDP, UNCDF, UNEST & DGSU”. This means that all the information in this presentation came from the UN agencies in Timor-Leste and based on their perception good or bad about the governance of Timor-Leste. The presentation said that “the executive, especially Prime Minister is seeking more and more power at the expense of parliament and the judiciary. By the end of 2012 this may have diminished the effective roles of the other two pillars and significantly reduced the accountability of the executive and rule of law, with the rule of Prime Minister.“ This statement means the executive especially the Prime Minister is looking to grab greater power from the Parliment and the Tribunal. (Tribunál de Contas reveals big political attacks). Prior to 2012 the results of this process is the effective responsibility of these two sovereign bodies (this refers to the Parliment and and tibunal) with the executive responsibility , the state’s democratic right will diminish, and “rule of law” will diminish, but the rule of the Prime Minister will be greater...” If we were to summarise this statement a little it means that UN and its agencies think that the Prime Minister is becoming a great obsticle for the development of democray in Timor-Leste.

UNMIT’s statement from the retreat shows that they wanted to incorrectly interpret the Prime Minister’s position regarding the democratisation process in Timor-Leste. They incorrectly interpreted in two funds which we previously mentioned, Human Capital Fund which comes under the Prime Minister and Infrastructure Fund which also comes under the Prime Minister. I do not want to explain why the two funds, to the public - even less to the UN because they always see themselves as beter than the Timorese, especialy about democratisation, reform in the security sector as well as justice.

Reactions to UNMIT’s statement came from many quarters, including the Opposition, President of the Republic as well as the Pirme Minister himself. The first UNMIT presentation was like a good “vitamin” for the opposition party. That is why Fretilin’s frontbench, through Anicetio Guterres, was happy to put out a political declaration to absolutely justify and support UNMIT’s opinion.

This is clear because, as an opposition party, Fretilin received great support from UNMIT’s statement. Second, reaction from the President of the Republic Dr Ramos Horta. Dr Ramos Horta angrily said that this is a dumb person’s report and added that “I think this was probably done by a dumb person”. We see who was responsible for the oil for food program in Iraq , 100% corruption, $60 billion of corruption. So it is better for the great dumbies not to talk too much” (www.temposemanal.timor.blogspot.com). Third, reaction came from the Prime Minister himself when he said “UNMIT does not know me”. There were many aspects that the Prime Minister mentioned in his speech to the UNTL academic seminar on 17th of May 2011 at the Dili Convention Centre. However, I would add to the two topics which the Prime Minister mentioned in his speech which is very important. One of the topics is regarding the IDPs problem in 2008 and the other is about the joint Commando Operations between F-FDTL and PNTL to solve the rebel situation in 2008. We will begin with the the problem of IDPs. The question as how to solve the problem of IDPs I humbly would like to tell you a little story regarding this topic. In 2008 after the attempted assassination of the President Ramos Horta and the Prime Minster Xanana Gusmao, Parliamentary President Fernando Lasama de Araujo called a high level meeting at the Palacio das Cinzas in Kaikoli. In this meeting there were many agendas to be discussed including questions regarding a solution for the IDPs. How will the IDPs return to their homes, as well as how many years it will take to solve this problem? A Deputy SRSG (I will not mention names) quickly said that the UN has experience solving problems of IDPs in many countries, especially in Africa. That is why the Deputy SRSG added that it will take 10-15 years to be able to close down the IDP camps. Members of the government that participated in this meeting were surprised because the Government’s intention was this; maybe the problem of IDPs and the Petitioners case needed to be solved much quicker so we could focus on the nation’s development.

After listening to the UN’s opinion, the Prime Minister said what he was thinking: that the people of Timor-Leste that are now IDPs are not the same as the people of Africa. Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao also said, “I know the people’s suffering, a people who suffered during the long war, that is why the government will need 2-3 years to solve the problem of IDPs, there is no need to take 10-15 years”. “This was said and done”, within 2 years. The case of 150,000 IDPs was quickly solved. Timor- Leste’s own experience realy showed that with hard work between all the state bodies, especially the State Secretariat for Natural Disasters with the Ministry for Social Solidarity, the IDPs case was solved within 2-3 years. “ If the leader of the state and government listened to UN’s thinking , like we needed 10-15 years to solve the the IDP’s case , then even today the IDPs would still be staying underneath the tarpaulins in front of Hotel Timor, Obrigadu Baracks, Metinaro and Hera and many more places.” However we (all state bodies) together can solve the problem of IDPs”.

The Prime Minister’s speech also mentioned about the Joint Commando Operation between FALINTIL-FDTL and PNTL in 2008. This operation was decided by the Council of Ministers, then the President of the Republic was consulted and the Supreme interinu commander Fernando Lasama de Araujo declared martial law. The Council of Ministers nominated Brigadier General (now Major General) Tau Matan Ruak for the responsibility to establish the Joint Commando Operation and Commander Alfonso de Jesus (now Adjuntu Komisariu PNTL) as the Commandant and Vise Commandant of the Joint Operation. The reasons to establish the Joint Operation are; first, our hopes in the international institution, the International Stabilising Force (ISF) from Australia and New Zealand did not produce results. The whole night the Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence and Security, as well as SED, SES, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak and Commandant Afonso de Jesus met with ISF Commandant to conduct an operation to solve the problem of the rebels. However after the ISF conducted their two day operation, ISF inform that they encountered difficulties as they did not know these people. Second, it was not the UNPOL’s competence, as well as UNPOL’s lack of capacity to solve this problem. They did not come to face such great risks in a situation as difficult as this. It is because of these two reasons that the state decided to establish the Joint Operation. The results from the Joint Operation showed the whole world that once again the Timorese can solve their problems on their own. A Joint Operation in Timor-Leste’s own way. (Timorese way) can foster stability for this beloved country. A Major from New Zealand that worked in the Joint Commando Operation, wrote a report that said the Joint Operation was successful because there was first a positive integration between F-FDTL and PNTL, and it showed that they can work together. Second, the Operation had knowledge about the rebels and found support from the population base.

Third: the implementation of a psychological military tactic that was not intended to kill the target. It is because of this Joint Operation, that Timor-Leste found success in solving the case of the Petitioners in 2008. However, at that time, we were met with great challenges from Timorese themselves who did not believe in our two forces, as well as from UNMIT. UNMIT said that Timor-Leste was mixing the role of the Armed Forces with that of the Police Force, they accused the government of starting to militarise the police. However they had forgotten that during the Joint Operation these two forces found a good opportunity to work together and develop confidence in each other after the 2006 crisis.

If we analyse well, we can see that Timor-Leste has a long experience with violence. After the Restoration of Independence, every two years Timor-Leste entered into a difficult situation. On 4th December 2002, violence appeared in Dili. People burnt the Hello Mister shop, burnt other shops in Kolmera as well as Marie Alkatiri’s house in Pantai Kelpa. In 2004 violence appeared in Lospalos between some members of FALINTIL-FDTL and PNTL. The previous government together with the President of the Republic Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao established a team to conduct an investigation. In 2006 a political and military crisis appeared that brought a great problem to this new country. The problem of IDPs and the Petitioners had yet to be solved and then the problem of the attempted assassination of the Head of State Dr. Ramos Horta and Head of the Government Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao. However this government led by Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao broke the chain of biannual conflict in 2010. Even if we encountered many problems and very difficult situations during the time of independence, we showed to the whole world that we ourselves can find solutions to solve our problems. The UN may have a lot of experience regarding conflict in other countries, like Africa, however they can not apply their experience in Timor-Leste because they do not know the Timor-Leste people.

The reaction from the President of the Republic we can say that even though at times our words are harsh, it seems that UN are really dumb. Finally, UNMIT continues to think, as well as tries to teach many things to the Timorese. I can provide an example to this effect. On 6 May 2011 some members of the government such as Vice-Prime Minister Jose Luis Guterres, together with State Secretary of Defence, State Secretary of Security, Vice Minister of Finance, and Vice Minister for Economy and Development met with UNMIT staff including Amira Haq’s Chief of Staff Toby Lanze, Murry McCullough (Security sector Reform Unit UNMIT) and the UNPOL commissary Luis Carilho and other staff to discuss the “Transition Plan”. In a presentation regarding Good Governance, an UNMIT staff member spoke strongly asking the Timor-Leste Government to quickly establish institutions to oversee the areas of Good Governance as well as Democracy. Reponding one by one as a diplomat and Vice-Prime Minister, Dr Jose Luis Guterres, extended his appreciation to UNMIT’s suggestion, however the reaction from the Secretary for Security was much stronger. There is no need to institutionalise democracy through a special state institution because democracy is consecrated in the constitution and comes from the committment between the state, civil society and the people of Timor-Leste. Civil Society, like HAK foundation, Rede Feto as well as other NGOs that watch over democracy and human rights. Currently we do not have a special institution to watch over the area of democracy, however democracy and human rights continue to proceed, because of the constitution and the commitment of the Timorese people.

Regarding the UN’s mission in Timor-Leste, we can also analyse that sometimes UNMIT is infiltrated by international and national people that have separate political agendas. The newspaper Timor Post on 24^th May said that presently China has intentions to setup its intelligence in South East Asia. However, Timor-Leste needs to remember that this infiltration does not only come from China, but may come from other countries including infiltration from within the institution of UNMIT to seek information for their own country. So Timor-Leste does not need to fear, when there are some views that UNMIT also has many people who work in it, not for the UNMIT mission but for their country. Regarding this topic, we can analyse that there are two groups and one political group that is working and delivering the UN mission in Timor-Leste (this analysis may be wrong or right). First there is a group that is working for other countries “collecting information”so as to deliver other country’s work. This group is forcing its wishes and when they encounter some challenges, they always create public opinion to make the situation in the country worse. This group does not want the beloved country Timor-Leste to develop itself and become and independent sovereign.

Second, the group that wants to give great support to Timor-Leste to slowly become a developed nation. This group at this time is like “burung terkurung dalam sangkar”. This group has dominated the UNMIT leadership since the start, but between these groups, the first group dominates.

Third, a group of Timorese who work for UNMIT. There are many Timorese that are truly committed to the development of this beloved country. That, however, it is not wrong that there are some who are taking advantage of UNMIT to pursue their political, personal or group’s mission. PM Xanana in his speech said that “I want to say to the Timorese , that have become UNMIT experts , not to show off, there is no need to grovel for other people’s money because this is a bad sickness that we call: mental colonialism or intellectual colonialisim”. The Timorese that follow PM Xanana do not want UNMIT to leave Timor-Leste. In this world, interdependence and dependence between countries is a normal topic but, regading a new nation like Timor-Leste, there needs to be an end to premature dependence in this country.

I just wanted to say that what has now become public policy regarding UNMIT’s presentation from the retreat happened in January 2011, and that clearly it was not a report. However we can say that this presentation is an opinion for the UNMIT institution as well as other UN agencies in Timor-Leste. However, according to some deep sources from some people in the UN, this retreat involved the UN leadership. This means that the opinion of the UN leadership in Timor-Leste is negative regarding the government and the Prime Minister. UN is like an institution that needs to be neutral in political topics. UNMIT’s mandate in Timor-Leste is to give support to the state of Timor-Leste in all aspects, not to come and destroy and give contradictive opinions on the national development and progress.

This article is only a personal opinion

Crisis Group Highly Critic UNMIT

Crisis Group Web

The International Crisis Group has yesterday release a report on the UN in Timor-Leste, and plan for it future.  The report is highly critical of both the UNMIT and the Timorese Government, but states that among other things the international community needs to reduce UNMIT Police alot, and close down its security sector reforms.  This is because these have either not provided anything useful or are not desired by the Government of Timor-Leste.

The report states that: 

"The policing contingent of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) should be sharply reduced in size to reflect improvements in security since the 2006 crisis and to support future stability. Since 2008 the Timorese have shown themselves determined to handle internal threats without the support of the UN’s third-largest policing mission. The local force has answered to its own command rather than UN police. The government has for years ignored UN advice on undertaking difficult reforms in the security sector or pursuing formal justice for crimes committed. A mostly stable coalition government elected in 2007 seems to be able to survive its own weaknesses. Real risks to the country’s stability do remain – many the result of the government’s failure to tackle impunity for the events of 2006. These will be best addressed by the country’s political leaders rather than a continued international police presence. When UNMIT’s mandate is renewed in February 2011, the UN should acknowledge the futility of its security sector reform efforts in the face of government disinterest.

While they made an important contribution to the immediate post-crisis stabilisation, UN police were never equipped to conduct the highly political task of police reform. More than four years into the mission, there is still no agreed plan for how to support reform of Timor-Leste’s police. The government has embarked on its own efforts with limited capacity. A comprehensive overhaul of the rank structure undertaken in 2010 was a real step towards the professionalisation and independence of the police. The government has shown little interest in UN recommendations to punish police linked to turmoil in 2006 and has taken over a joint vetting process that will likely end with very limited results. More recent disciplinary cases have reinforced the image of a force unwilling or unable to punish wrongdoing from within its own ranks. The district-by-district process of handing back responsibility from the UN to the Timorese police has nevertheless progressed steadily, with some pressure for a full handover by March 2011.

Key recommendations on justice and security sector reforms made by international bodies after the crisis have been systematically ignored. The work of the UN Independent Commission of Inquiry has been undermined as the most prominent prosecutions it proposed have been shelved; others have either been thrown out for lack of evidence, have ended in presidential pardons or are still under investigation four years later. The effect has been to deny justice and corrode the rule of law, leaving the country without a strong disincentive for political violence. This is dangerous, but more international police will not solve it.

The UN mission has poorly handled its mandate to assist in broader security sector reform and its efforts have been consistently rebuffed by the government. The review of the security sector intended to guide policy development remains unpublished four years later and at this stage its release would be irrelevant. The UN’s stated goal of delineating the roles of the police and the army has been rejected by Timorese leaders in favour of bringing the two forces closer together to avoid rivalry. The security sector support unit of the mission should be closed.

As talk of “right-sizing” the peacekeeping mission begins with an eye towards its withdrawal by December 2012, it is clear that such a large mission is currently not tailored to the country’s needs. As its executive policing role looks likely to end in early 2011 with the completion of the handover, the police contingent should be reduced by at least half. Current plans for only a limited reduction will leave an oversized police contingent that will mask the continued operational and logistical deficiencies in Timor-Leste’s police. The government and the Timorese police command should engage those UN police who do remain on how best to address these deficiencies between now and the mission’s full withdrawal.

In addition, immediate priorities for discussions underway between the government and the UN mission on the future of UNMIT should include:

• A binding agreement with the government on a limited set of priorities for training and support to core functions of the Timorese police by those UN police that remain, including investigations and disciplinary mechanisms.

• Clarification of the likely terms of any handover of assets of the UN mission.

• Support for an independent assessment of the needs and capacity of Timor-Leste’s police, as requested by the government, which could serve as a tool for planning future domestic and bilateral training.

• Discussion with the Australia/New Zealand International Stability Force regarding the timing of the departure of the international security presence in Timor-Leste (ISF and UNPOL).

• Discussion of an ongoing political role for the UN in supporting the 2012 elections as well as in political and human rights monitoring after the full withdrawal of UNMIT.

The UN will leave behind much unfinished work in building the capacity of Timor-Leste’s police, but the violence of 2006 was caused more by a failure to address political issues than it was by technical weakness in the country’s security services. The best way to maintain stability through the 2012 elections would be a strong commitment to peaceful political competition by Timor-Leste’s leaders."

UN Security Council Delegation Cancels Trip to Timor-Leste

A delegation from the UN Security Council was schedule to visit Timor-Leste in a few days.  However, Tempo Semanal sources have revealed that the delegation has cancelled its intentions.

Some days ago the NYC based "Security Council Report" issued a statement saying that:


"The Council is considering a visit to Timor-Leste at the end of November. Japan, as the lead country on Timor-Leste, has pushed for this visit. The number of Council members going on the mission was uncertain at press time. While no members have objected to the visit, it appears that a number of countries will not be represented at ambassador level and some members may decide not to participate at all. A decision also had not been made on whether the Council delegation should confine the visit to Dili or consider a field trip outside the capital. The last Council visit to Timor-Leste was in November 2007. Japan will lead the mission. It has argued that it is time to review the UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) prior to mandate renewal on 26 February 2011. Japan appears keen to have the visit take place before it leaves the Council at the end of 2010. It may also want to discuss the format of the UN presence post-UNMIT, but others feel that this would be premature.

Based on the views expressed in the 19 October debate other Council members are likely to be interested in exchanging views with the Timorese authorites on the security situation, the resumption of Timorese responsibility in the final three districts and justice and accountability issues. A number of members, including the US, the UK and Austria, seem to be looking forward to an exchange on justice and impunity."

Based on Tempo Semanal sources trip has been cancelled due to the fact that Timor-Leste is no longer a priority issue for the Security Council and that its time is being allocated to other more pressing matters.

General Taur Matan Ruak Questions Jeffrey Sachs on International Aid.

On Thursday 1 April 2010, Jeffrey Sachs, Economic Adviser to the Secretary General of the United Nations invited the leadership of Timor-Leste's defence force (FALINTIL-FDTL) and national police service (PNTL) to a meeting at the Ministry of Finance, in Dili Timor-Leste.

 

Jeff Sachs

During the discussion Major-General Taur Matan Ruak, Chief of the Defence Force asked about the use of donors funds in Timor-Leste over the past decade.

Major General Taur Matan Ruak

Major-General Ruak stated "I have participated in many discussions with Government and I want to know what you consider to be good and bad practise? He further stated that, "international aids to Timor-Leste in the last 10 years was more or less $12.7 billion but its result was an increase is poverty and unemployment. What are the main issues with international aid? I want an explanation to these questions." 

Mr. Sachs answered, "I think this is difficult for me to give an answer but I think the international experts need to consider this question with seriousness and I myself will look at the implementation process closely in the future."  The former guerrilla commander raised the same question to former SRSG Hasegawa years ago, but Hasegawa failed to respond in detail suggesting that it was donor funds as opposed to UN money.

On 7 September 2009 Associated Press reported in "East Timor Aid: Where did the Billions Go?" between 1999 and 2009 that the international community has spent 8.8 billion in aid for Timor but that "little of the money, perhaps no more than a dollar of every 10, appears to have made it into East Timor's economy. Instead, it goes toward foreign security forces, consultants and administration, among other things. In the meantime, data from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Food Program, U.N. Development Program and others show the money has done little to help the poor. In fact, poverty has increased. Roads are in disrepair, there is little access to clean water or health services, and the capital is littered with abandoned, burned-out buildings where the homeless squat."

There are some attempts at increasing the positive economic impact of the international presence in Timor-Leste.  One international NGO the Peace Dividend Trust works closely with international agencies to increase their local procurement in Timor, but it remains a relatively small effort.  Its Senior Adviser Edward Rees told Tempo Semanal "the international community is slowly coming around to the idea that the international presence can be an economic engine to create jobs build the domestic private sector." He further stated "Our Peace Dividend Marketplace project funded by AusAID Norway and others in partnership with the Ministry of Toursim Commerce and Industria while quite successful, remains limited in what it can do partially because it remains on 12 month funding cycles and because it is a relatively small actor in a larger Paris Declaration debate."

During the 2008 Timor-Leste Development partner meeting the Timorese NGO Forum called for "the Government to join our call on international partners to increase local spending, helping to stimulate job creation and build private sector capacity."

President Jose Ramos-Horta also has spoken out in an 2009 interview with Al Jazeera on the matter of how international aid for Timor-Leste has been spent in the past 10 years. President Horta states that if "international aid had been spent in Timor it would have transformed the country....but this is not the case."

In January 2010 the Secretary General reported to the Security Council on UNMIT, which still has a annual 2009-2010 budget of over $200 million, that "“UNMIT is not a negligible factor in the Timor-Leste economy. The Mission spends about $20 million annually in Timor-Leste (for local procurement and national staff salaries), compared with a Government budget volume of $650 million for 2010. The total economic footprint of the Mission is higher, as indirect spending (rent, local services) by the international staff should also be taken into account."

Respected local NGO Lao Hamutuk responded "We urge UNMIT to practice more transparency and local content in procurement and hiring to set a good example for Timor-Leste. In addition, efforts should be made to increase the 9.7% of the UNMIT budget (paras. 137 and 170) which enters the local economy.[11] During the past decade, many international consultants, advisors, “volunteers” and staff have advanced their careers and bank accounts while working “on” Timor-Leste; it is only fair that Timor-Leste’s people also benefit from this money.”

Starting today until 10 April the 2010 Timor-Leste Development Partners Meeting will convene in Dili, Timor-Leste.  The background paper for this meeting states that "progress has been made within the Ministry of Finance regarding the tracking of Development Partner spending, submitted to the National Directorate for Aid Effectiveness (NDAE) as part of the 2010 Combined State Budget."  Timorese civil society will no doubt be interested to review the results of this tracking performed by the Ministry of Finance.

Minister of Finance Emilia Pires, appeared on TVTL national television news on the evening of 6 April 2009 and stated that international partners have not yet lived up to their obligations with regards to the Paris Declaration regarding how Government and donors cooperate on the allocation and spending of donor funds for Timor-Leste.

Vice Minister of Finance, Government of Timor-Leste Slams the UN.

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN TIMOR-LESTE:

Great expectation to leave “good memories” and “positive legacies” before ending its mandate in 2012

A Local Perspective

By Rui Manuel Hanjam, M.phil

A former local staff of UNAMET and UNTAET (1999/2000) - Now Vice Minister of Finance.

The United Nations, as an institution, has devoted extraordinary efforts to resolve conflicts around the world. The world needs a strong, neutral institution to perform an important role in conflict prevention and resolution. Timor-Leste is part of this global institution’s mandate to maintain its presence in order to guarantee the country self determination, stability, a smooth transition towards independence and the development of democratic state institutions. This mandate has progressed through various missions, namely: UNAMET, UNTAET, UNOTIL, UNMISET and UNMIT.

 For each mission in Timor-Leste, the UN headquarter has assigned Special Representatives of the Secretary General,of different nationalities (with the exception of Kamalesh Sharman and Athul Khare who both hold Indian nationality) each with different characters and styles of leadership: Ian Martin, for UNAMET’s popular consultation in 1999; the late Sergio Viera de Melo for the United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTAET), Kamalesh Sharman for the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), later replaced by Sukehiro Hasegawa for the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNMISET), and Athul Khare for the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). The successor of Athul Khare is Ameerah Hag from Bangladesh, who is presently serving for the UNMIT mission, (until now, there is no further information on whether the UN headquarters will review and change the name of the current mission UNMIT, based on Ian Martin’s Technical Assessment Mission)

This article is a contribution, from a local perspective, that intends to discuss the successes and failures of these successive UN missions and provide recommendations for improving future missions, specifically in terms of communication and capacity building with the local counterparts.. This will allow the UN, as an institution,  to make adjustments or changes based on these  recommendations.  Until now, in Timor-Leste, there is a wide-shared belief and high expectations that by the end of the mission in 2012, the UN will leave “good memories” or “positive legacies” rather than negative ones. It is hoped in the future these negative examples may be avoided so that other host countries will smoothly deliver efficient and effective administrations.

UNAMET and its impossible mission

The UNAMET mission, of which I was a part , was considered to be a very successful mission from its inception with the signing of the May 5th agreement in 1999 until the popular consultation, carried out on August 30, 1999 and the announcement of the result on September 4, 1999.

The success of the mission can not be separated from the “strong leadership” that was exercised by Ian Martin as a capable diplomat with vast experiences dealing with human rights matters in Amnesty International and as Deputy of the UN mission in Haiti. Both experiences enriched his career allowing him to control elements inside the mission itself, such as UNPOL, Military Liaison Officers, Military Observers, as well as the UN Voluntary staff, who supported the popular consultation on the ground upon their deployment.

The mission, in a short time, under the guidance of high caliber professionals in the media like David Wimhurst and his team, was able to disseminate educational information about ballot papers, how to vote etc. by using various channels of information such as TV, radio and other printed information like pamphlets and leaflets, so that people were educated in a short time and were able to absorb information about the voting process.

As a result, the popular consultation was carried out professionally with an excellent turnout and minimum irregularities by which the majority of the voters confirmed their position of self determination by casting their votes leading to independence. Therefore, many Timorese whom I have  met regard this mission as an “impossible mission”.

Many people who were impressed by the victory expected a peaceful hand over, such as; Macao (from Portugal to China) or HongKong (from Great Britain to China).Unfortunately, there was no “happy ending” of the UNAMET mission due to the premeditated Indonesian “scorth earthed policy” in 1999 to burn down and to destroy the 27th Province. Timor’s infrastructure and thousands of homes were reduced to smoke and ashes in only two weeks and the violence resulted in massacres and deaths, injuries and forced deportations.

The UN could have handled the Timorese refugees within the siege of the UN compound more competently and compassionately. The Timorese civilians in the compound were there only because, out of desperation, they threw their children over the razor wire and then stormed the compound after being harassed and threatened  by armed Polri in the school grounds who  said  when the UN left they would kill them- These threats had been earlier reported to JOC  nevertheless they were left helplessly in the  school  yard until they took their safety in their own hands.

With UN personnel and 1500 Timorese refugees in UNAMET HQ under siege, we knew, for sure, that Ian was under pressure to communicate the reality on the ground to the headquarters in New York so that the headquarters would accept the evacuation of the Timorese staff and refugees with UN staff in 1999. As Timorese local staff, who worked for this mission, we clearly understood that the negotiation was very tough. Ian Martin was struggling to convey the message through the mission’s political section to convince Kofi Annan in NY to influence the Security Council to take urgent action to address the critical condition in 1999.

Meanwhile as part of “bargaining power” to allow local staff and civilians who resided temporarily in UNAMET compound to be evacuated to Darwin , local staff had gathered together with the  civilians to lay down on the ground at the main gate of UNAMET compound prepared to let the UN vehicles pass over them if the UNAMET only evacuated international staff. This action was also a statement to show the international community that Timor was not under the control of the Indonesian security forces as spelt out in the agreement. Furthermore, most UN staff and remaining journalists within the compound also refused to leave without the Timorese. If it was not for the mutiny within the compound, the UN would have abandoned the Timorese families to a horrific fate.  After the evacuation the UNHQ was moved to the Australian consulate because the walls were high and Timorese refugees would not be an issue. The final decision took longer than expected which is why the process of evacuation was executed only on the 12 September, eight days after the violence erupted on the 4th after the announcement of the result in 1999. 

The tragic violence in September 1999 was beyond the unarmed UNAMET mission’s control; however, it maintained continuity of mission by moving its operation temporarily to Darwin. The successful evacuation of the civilians and local staff was intended to justify the intervention of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). UNAMET waited until the INTERFET was able to restore and normalize the chaotic situation before deploying humanitarian assistance and handing over to UNTAET. 

UNTAET and its preparation of Timorese Administration

The United Nations Transitional Administration was established in July 2000, under the Security Council Resolution 1272. . The UNTAET mission was to support a greater autonomy of decision making and the progressive transfer of governance to a full Timorese government. In a meeting held in Tibar, the then SRSG, Sergio Viera de Mello proposed the concept of a joint government, which gave rise to the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA)  combining International staff and Timorese to fill the  nine portofolios of the transitional government structure The UNTAET also created the first Council of Ministers with its thirteen portofolios to make important decisions and carry out a democratic election to form Constituent Assembly which was considered to be the embryo of the Timorese Parliament.

Initially the lack of crucial resources was debilitating for the huge task at hand.  While departments tried to function with one or two computers. It appeared that the procurement of some resources was badly mismanaged by an Indian who was appionted to be the procurement advisor, eg the choice of Tata vehicles which were generally useless in the districts because of perpetual mechanical problems and low quality of the vehicles.  The presence of the ship-hotels was another sign of mismanagement..It would have been cheaper to construct dormitories and leave the Timorese with infrastructure than use the ships which were also a blatant symbol of inequality and decadence in the shattered little nation.

There is no doubt that the establishment of the Transitional Administration encountered many challenges both from the Timorese side to reach “common consensus” and from the UN side to efficiently manage its multi agencies and multi-nationalities under the UNTAET umbrella  in order  to lead the country to move ahead. In this regard, Sergio Viera de Mello played an important role with his combination of Latino and Commonwealth style (see Dionisio Babo’ Paper). There was also the additional challenge of bringing together all political parties and successfully unifying them in the decision making process. This was successfully achieved by Sergio, hand in hand with the Conselho National da Resistençia Timorense (CNRT), under the leadership of Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao. As a Brazilian, Sergio absorbed and adapted easily to Timorese culture that had historically been partially influenced by Portugal. Sergio was also sensitive to local culture and religion which was a consideration of   each decision that he made.  Not only that, Sergio had a strong leadership style and was able to bring all entities within the UN system together and he focused on this important task. However, dealing with the reality on the ground is always difficult and he faced many challenges.  Sergio honestly recognised UN weaknesses in the ruling Transitional Administration. This was expressed as I quoted in my interview with him during my research for my Masters thesis as follows:

“,....There are lots of “trials and errors” at the beginning. The UN was not prepared, equipped either in materials, words or in terms of human resources to assume those functions quickly and efficiently. So, it is very difficult to adapt other experiences. We were not governing in Cambodia, we were not governing in Namibia. So, we could not really compare everything. What we are doing here is new and particularly difficult because of the destruction and the collapse of the previous administration. We have never seen that before. Therefore we have to “invent” UNTAET. It is like a laboratory. New experiment, with mistakes, like the old experiment. In experimental science, you try, you make  mistakes, you do not really find the answer, you try again until you say, yes this is the way. That is how we do it here...” (clip interview, 2001)   

Sergio Viera’s comments reflected the reality in Timor. This also sent a clear message that “successful lessons learned” from elsewhere cannot be simply adopted due to complexities of the host countries in many areas such as the political sphere, culture, religion etc.

Despite the  successes mentioned above and consultative processes that were initiated by Sergio, the mission, according to Timorese public opinion, failed to implement the Pacta Unidade Nasional (National Unity Pact) that required unity and power sharing both in government and parliament among the leaders of political parties that had grievances in the past (Fretilin, Apodeti, UDT, Kota and Trabalista).  This exacerbated the situation when there was no democratic election, but rather a transformation of the Constituent Assembly to become the legislative body in the parliament. This  was considered to be a disaster in a post conflict country like Timor-Leste, where a period of 10-5 years is necessary to  acquire  leadership maturity to maintain unity, stability and full  acceptance of democratic elections (read also Bishop Belo’s comments) and the endorsement of a check and balance mechanism.

There are many commentators who stated that the crisis of 2006 was due, in part, to the lack of experience of the leaders to exercise the state democratic rules and to carry out their functions and this created conflicts. The situation was worsened by the unhealthy communication by the leaders to maintain their interests. Timorese leaders should have assumed their responsibility and function as “role models” for democracy. Unfortunately, the concept of a democratic institution is still vague and not understood clearly by the public and in particular by Timorese leaders.

Again, going back to de Mello’s image of a laboratory experiment, there is a common perception with its argument that the UNTAET was keen to test the rules, values and norms of democracy in the initial stage, in order to be able to ensure that the result corresponded to the mission’s mandate. If the 2012 mandate is the last mandate, then a democratic country in its infant stage should have been established and begun to develop towards a mature democracy like those in the West..

Human rights in theory and practice: the case of all missions in Timor-Leste

Human rights cannot be a mere slogan for people. The values of human rights should be upheld by everybody, particularly all UN staff everywhere. By upholding the values and principles of human rights and attaching and embedding them in their daily lives, they can serve accordingly without any constraint in practical terms of their daily work.

But, what is nicely written on paper is sometimes different in reality. There were several incidents that reflected “inconsistency” with these values and principles. Consequently, we, local staff,  felt very frustrated and powerless during the UN missions in Timor-Leste where overt inequalities were practiced by an institution that operates  under the concept of multinationalism .

UN staff who left Timor-Leste had contributed many “good” memories and some bad memories. The good of course, should be the guidelines and continued practice of the country’s future administration and the bad should be discarded. However, we need to consider the bad for reflection on institutional improvement.

Many Timorese commented that the “transfer” of the Serious Crime Unit work into National Court, was  an attempt by the UN to escape its responsibility.  Ironically, on the one hand, this helped the Timorese to accelerate the process of reconciliation, but on the other hand, as a strong institution, the UN should continue to stand firm. Human rights must be internationally upheld without weakening the UN commitment to them,. otherwise a negative message is sent setting a precedence of inconsistency.

There were also a series of incidents which indicated the violation of human rights and the UN code of conduct. Unequal treatment was experienced by many local staff. For example, during UNAMET in Ermera,  three local staff and an international staff member had arrived by helicopter from the Public Information Office based in Dili. A UN  staff, Mr. Samukai from Liberia  forced the  three local staff to squeeze in the back of the car next to piles of baggage, tires and papers while the international staff member had plenty of room in the front seat. I was one of the three local staff and we did not press the matter because of our focus and commitment to help the UNAMET to hold the consultation without constraints. Later I discovered that Mr Samukai held an important position in his country.  We discussed among ourselves that we  were entitled to equal treatment As  Timorese, of course,  we were shocked because we assumed the human rights value of equality would prevail as it has perpetually been promoted by every UN mission as a guideline for its staff.

In the initial stage of transition from UNAMET to UNTAET, there was a shop open for UN staff that provided fast food. All the items were brought from Australia. After the destruction most Timorese staff  were hardly able to find such shops. Another frustration for the locals was the decision that items had to be purchased on presenting an international passport. Of course, it meant only internationals, were served, not the Timorese. I was lucky that some generous international staff  with whom I worked helped me by buying limited goods for me from the shop, most  Timorese were not  so lucky. I mention this to underline that equal treatment should be across the board in UN missions which would ensure that the institution would be respected by everyone.  I tink. This will be a challenge for the UN as an institution that is currently led by the Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon.

Moreover, a Human Rights Unit is always attached to UN missions in conflict areas. During UNAMET, Ian Martin, as a person who worked for Amnesty International, was fully aware of human rights issues and he absolutely disagreed with unequal practices if three of us were able to bring these issues to his attention.

During the transition from UNAMET to UNTAET, Timorese staff including myself worked for the Public Information Office. We had to rush to finalize media releases and news for radio and TV and  to meet deadlines for broadcasting. A female staff who arrived late was kicked in her bottom and, she fell and smashed her own computer. I again, I was shocked, and  we raised questions among ourselves- “is this the  real UN with human rights values or is it just  empty rhetoric?” or  was the UN unable to program its own multinational staff . I joined our other friends, (who have now mostly become diplomats,) to discuss with Manuel Almeida, who was our new Public Information Office Director,  how to solve the issue. Again, I was informed that Sergio might be upset if the issue was brought to his attention.

These are just two examples of discrimination. There were many abuses and discriminative acts practiced by internationals during that period which were not brought to the attention of the head of both UNAMET and UNTAET. But, I was very optimistic that the Head of the two missions would have seriously taken action if those issues were brought to his attention.

There were many criticisms directed at all the UN Missions in Timor-Leste. A serious issue is UN immunity that is applicable to all UN mission staff in most conflict and post conflict countries.  This allows UN staff to exercise their roles without fear in helping the country move towards peace and harmony. However, there were several incidents where the UN staff and UNPOL were involved in criminal “hit and run” cases,   and immediately the UN Headquarters arranged for the perpetrators to leave the country without further investigation, resolution or compensation to the families of the victims (read the statement of discontent expressed by both PNTL General commander and an article by the Secretary State for Defense and some images of torture captured by local TV). During several discussions that I had with the family of the victims, they raised their concerns.

The incidents that involved UNPOL members in two violent acts resulted in the UN leadership intervening in order to deport the UNPOL members back to their own countries. Furthermore, this was done without a transparent mechanism to satisfy the families of the victims.  These incidents have set a bad example in police practice. Commenting in a workshop, Longinhos emphasized, Timorese police lack capacity because  their teacher (UN) is unable to provide the best quality of capacity building, meaning when “the teacher is weak the students are also weak” (Suara Timor Lorosae, February 15, 2010) Many people have no doubt that if Timorese police are unable to act professionally in dealing with criminals and  traffic violators it is partially due to  the unprofessional manner some UNPOL  handle law breakers and  enforce the rule of law..

This also applies to unprofessional and disrespectful behaviors by some UNPOL to local authorities. For example  in the case of searching the vehicles of Taur Matan Ruak jointly by UNPOL and ISF (International Stability Force).  And in the case of the smashing of vehicles and  the rude behavior by Philipino UNPOL to the Vice Minister of Finance which  was brought to the attention of the SRSG Atul Khare. The investigation had been carried out in an unsatisfactory manner, so the SRSG requested to have a second investigation, however the SRSG stated, he was not aware of the incident and sent his deputy and political staff to convince the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister to drop the case because he was worried about the image of the UN mission and his own reputation.

Several times, when local authorities were invited to Obrigado Barracks for UN ceremonies, they felt intimidated at the UN gate by the bad-mannered attitude of security personnel. These incidents always caused tension.

Good Governance and bad practices to avoid

Good governance is a key word for post conflict countries. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is mainly responsible for assisting these countries to establish a transparent, effective and efficient governance. The UN defines “good governance” as,

The process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). In addition, good governance has 8 major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society.

As most Timorese observe, the UN efforts to enhance the capacity of the bureaucracy and administration of the new country is crucial. At least, the eight characteristics mentioned above should be fulfilled. All discussion about the national interest ensures high participation of all stakeholders. The process has been developed to the extent where these characteristics are generally implemented. My view is that good governance should be guided by the UN mission in Timor with good will and good example to be followed.

The critics of the good governance practices are prevalent. This is understandable in a post conflict country where everyone is in the process of learning. Nevertheless, the Country Assessment Strategies and other developmental documents are mostly prepared without the involvement of the Timorese (see the collection of 1500 documents produced during the State of the Nation Report). On many occasions, a process of consultation is held after these documents have been prepared by consultants hired by the UN missions - with the exception of the local decentralization document that is currently in the implementation stage to establish the thirteenth municipality.

Participation can be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. And, significantly, participation by both men and women is a key cornerstone of good governance. Most Timorese stakeholders have shared their concerns about gender participation. After gender education was lectured by many gender advisors hired by the UN, now, at last, we have for the first time where a female SRSG appointed to Timor-Leste. One wonders if gender participation is as well exercised as it is defined?

The issue of capacity building is being argued by some line ministries who work together with the UN international staff to provide training and the effective transfer of knowledge until such time when the UN leaves the country. However there is a growing feeling among the national stakeholders that the capacity building only takes place inside “Obrigado Barracks” i.e. HQ. If the UN believes in the capacity building with their Timorese copunterparts, by now, we would have witnessed the visible counterparts of UN advisors seating side-by-side with their counterparts in Line Ministries. However, the end result is mixed. It comes as no surprise that the government has to offer significant incentive to attract national staff who work for the UN to work for the government regardless of the cost that the government has to bear for the efficiency and effectiveness of transferring knowledge to the local counterparts who are, to some extent, performing below the standard requirements and low level of work ethos.  

Another national concern is the increase in poverty and unemployment despite billions of dollars in donor aid. President Horta  addressed this conundrum in is  speech to the 63rd Session of the UN General Assembly, pointing out that the monies had not  gone directly to  rural projects but the bulk went to overgenerous foreign consultancy fees, unnecessary  reports and recommendations and study missions. High international salaries, overseas procurement, imported supplies, foreign military and security spending have also siphoned off the major volume of donor aid  from urgent development programs and the struggling economy. To ensure future donor effectiveness, a comprehensive enquiry into how the  aid was spent must be conducted. Semilarly, in a workshop for preparation of rural development framework, the president reafirmed his statement “ if that is true, araound three billions have been spent, perhaps all the farmers or poor people in rural areas have enjoyed their lives and they have been able to drive BMW to the town.....”

There is a double standard by many UN staff who use UN vehicles to enjoy their off-duty life along the beaches while advising the government, in the interest of good governance, not to use government vehicles during the weekend.

Another hypocrisy occurs by some UN staff and UNPOL members who insist the owner of rental houses reduce the cost of the rent, yet demand the owners sign a false  receipt showing the amount that matches the UN entitlement, meanwhile they rent the rooms to their friends at a  higher charge and double the profit. What sort of good governance, integrity and honesty is this? Can this be a good example to follow? These kind of practices reflect badly on the UN which should take measures to prevent the exploitation of local people by its staff members and more carefully oversee the efficiency and effectiveness of its internal management.

Some of the UN staff have left their childreen. The former Aileu District Administrator, Mrs. Maria Paixao, in a discussion of gender issue took place in Hotel Timor, reafirmed that there are more then 100 childreen that need protection. For that, the UN HQ in Dili has requested to draft an UN intenal regulation for protection of the victims. It was brought into public discussion and consultation, meanwhile publicly never heard of its implementation.

The resolution of the maritime boundaries both with Indonesia and Australia is crucial for protecting Timor-Leste’s sovereignty and the prosperous development of its potential natural resources. Peter Galbright, played important role in the negotiation along with his Timorese counterpart, the former Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri who was in charged of Minister of Economy at the time of negotiation.  This effort should be praised as the success that potentially has channeled revenue to the new born country’ prospect of development. However, having only facilitated half  the process of joint exploration and shared profit with Australia , the UN must not leave Timor-Leste with the issue unresolved. Given the circumstance where the country has to sacrifice its maritime boundaries within fifty year time frame for negotiation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the people of Timor-Leste appreciate the many achievements of the UN Missions in Timor-Leste in its efforts to assist our new nation to develop its governance in an efficient and effective manner. For the government and people of Timor-Leste, bad lessons will act as references to be avoided and to indicate moves in the right direction. Furthermore good and bad lessons can educate the UN to perform in a professional, impartial, and affirmative way that will benefit other post conflict countries.

There remain great challenges for Ameerah Hag to work with her Timorese counterparts to bring about significant changes and we are optimistic that we will meet them successfully together. I hope that Ameerah will have gained lessons learned from her predecessors and apply sensible approach to the remaining period of the UN mission in Timor-Leste. Let’s hope that the bitter memories will never be repeated and that the UN can claim a lasting memory when they leave Timor-Leste once and for all.

Crisis Group Slams UNMIT and UNPOL performance in Timor-Leste

President Jose Ramos Horta Review Timorese PNTL Police 2009

Influential Organisation calls for Accelerated Handover of Policing Responsibility to PNTL from an under performing UNPOL/UNMIT.

Dili, Timor-Leste

On 3 December 2009 the Brussels based Crisis Group, with offices around the world's conflict and post conflict areas, including Dili issued a report and made strong calls for the United Nations to recognise their inability to adequately provide for executive policing in Timor-Leste and its failure to rebuild, restructure and reform the PNTL. The report lends credence to the fact that UNMIT and its leadership has largely failed in a key area of its mandate, as noted by this newspaper in earlier editions.  Much is hoped for from the new SRSG Ameera Haq.

Crisis Group is headed by former Head of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour.

“The task of reforming the local police remains unfinished, but prolonging the UN’s command will not fix the problem”, says Cillian Nolan, Crisis Group’s Timor-Leste Analyst.

A statement by Crisis Group states that "The United Nations should hand over formal control of the Timor-Leste police as soon as possible. A protracted process that began in May has taken a bureaucratic approach to assessing whether they are ready to take charge, but the reality on the ground is that the Timorese police have long operated under their own command. Without an agreed plan for reforming the country’s police after the 2006 crisis, the UN and the government have made a poor team for institutional development. A longer handover may further damage relations between the UN’s third-largest policing mission and the Timor-Leste government, which has refused to act as a full partner in implementing reforms. The UN has a continued role to play in providing an advisory presence in support of police operations. For this to work, the government must engage with the UN mission and agree upon the shape of this partnership. To make any new mandate a success, they need to use the remaining months before the current one expires in February 2010 to hammer out a detailed framework for future cooperation with the police under local command."

The report also notes currently the PNTL is displaying worrying tendencies.

"The General Commander’s effort to build a unified Special Police Unit could stem competition within the various squads over the long term. By giving prominence to elite military-style detachments, however, the morale of the rest of the police service could be undermined. It also risks further inflaming competition with the army. A recent parade marking the handover of the police training centre was telling. Members of the Special Police Unit’s three sub-units armed with military weapons

led the parade, marching alongside the border patrol and maritime detachments. All wore different newly designed uniforms. Behind them was a group of patrol officers from each of the country’s thirteen districts in regulation blue T-shirts. At the end stood a group of seven female officers. The important but mundane nature of policing is being sidelined by the promotion of its more militarised sections. Given the origins of the 2006 crisis, the decision to adopt a paramilitary model should be reconsidered."